What the U.S. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance Means for India
Plus, a deep dive into the Group of Minister's report on "Government Communication"
Hi there, I’m Aman Thakker. Welcome to Indialogue, a newsletter analyzing the biggest policy developments in India. The aim of this newsletter is to provide you with quality analysis every week on what’s going on in India.
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What the U.S. Interim National Security Strategic Guidance Means for India
On March 3, the Biden administration released a document titled the “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance.” The document, while not a full National Security Strategy, is an early indication of how the Biden administration will approach its national security policy. As such, although India is not prominently featured in the document, there are many implications for India. The full document is available here.
There was concern in some quarters in India that an incoming Biden administration would shift U.S. engagement with the world in two very important ways. First, then-candidate Biden’s emphasis on “Building Back Better” at home raised concerns that a U.S. government focused on ensuring a recovery at home following the COVID-19 pandemic, the aftermath of an insurrection, and persisting racial inequality may not focus too much on foreign policy. Secondly, there were fears that the Trump administration’s approach to China, which included naming it as a “strategic competitor” to the United States, emphasizing the need for a “free and open Indo-Pacific, and deepening defense ties with with India, might not be continued under President Biden.
The Interim Guidance, however, makes it clear where the Biden administration stands on these issues. The opening lines underscore that while recovery at home will certainly be a priority, the United States will not “shrink back,” but “boldly engage the world.” Moreover, a common thread throughout the document is the recognition that China “is the only competitor potentially capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.”
The document going on to define the core national security priorities for the Biden administration:
These priorities reflect a dual approach. The desire to promote a “favorable distribution of power” reflects a deeply realist approach to national security, while the emphasis on a “stable and open international system” reflects a more liberal internationalist approach.
India, in this case, is key to both. In its only direct reference to India, the document says that “We will deepen our partnership with India and work alongside New Zealand, as well as Singapore, Vietnam, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states, to advance shared objectives.” However, the broader document makes it clear how the Biden administration thinks of the U.S.-India relationship as advancing, both, a favorable distribution of power as well as a stable and open international system.
The document notes that the “China challenge” spans across areas such as illegal trade practices, cyber threat, coercive economic practices, securing supply chains, freedom of navigation, and more. From a U.S. national security perspective, deepening partnerships with India, a rising power in its own right in Asia with deep misgivings about an assertive China, can advance its desire for a “favorable balance of power.” As such, defense cooperation with India is seen as one of the ways the United States can ensure that it deters Chinese aggression that threatens “collective security, prosperity, and democratic way of life.”
However, the document also gives equal emphasis to ensuring that, at the heart of U.S. national security policy moving forward, there remains an emphasis on democracy. As well as calling for a Summit for Democracy later this year, the Biden administration stresses the need for the United States to “join with likeminded allies and partners to revitalize democracy the world over.” From a U.S. perspective, India, as the world’s largest democracy and a committed partner in creating a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, will be an important partner in this regard.
What does such an approach mean for India? India will welcome the centrality of Indo-Pacific and the Biden administration’s continuity on recognizing the need for strategic competition with China, which began under the Trump admin. While the Biden strategy is aimed at moderating or rectifying what they see as the Trump team's mistakes on China policy, India will nonetheless remain pleased that the Indo-Pacific remains an area of priority for the Biden administration.
However, while a very clear emphasis on democracy won't come as a surprise for India, it does bring back to the fore ongoing debates about India's "illiberal turn" can have the potential to modulate the pace of advancement of bilateral ties. India will, but of course, remain crucially important to U.S. strategic interests. However, there is no denying that India’s steps to muzzle freedom of speech or clamp down on minority rights, even if defined as India’s “internal matter,” can affect one of core ways in which the Biden administration has defined its priorities in its Interim Guidance. As I wrote last September:
Furthermore, while it is true that the United States has time and time again failed on race relations, or does woefully little to ensure every eligible voter gets their chance to vote doesn’t excuse India’s missteps. It doesn’t excuse India’s decision to instituting a curfew and a communications blackout in an entire former state, and lock up their politicians like in Jammu and Kashmir. It doesn’t excuse the Home Minister of India and former party President of the BJP calling Muslim immigrants “termites,” and suggesting that the combination of the CAA and NCR will be used to kick out unwanted immigrants. Whataboutism doesn’t help advance U.S.-India ties, or India’s foreign relations with any country or well-wisher that expresses concern about the turn India has made in its domestic policy.
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A Group of Ministers and a Battle for Narratives
A few months ago, Hindustan Times broke the story of a report on “Government Communications” written by a nine-member Group of Ministers which outlined recommendations for how spread its “positive messaging” more widely while counteracting criticism of the government.
While the Hindustan Times article focused only on the recommendations of the report, this story went into overdrive this week after The Caravan Magazine outlined what was in the complete report, including the process of how those recommendations were generated in conversations between government ministers, friendly reporters, and other analysts ideologically aligned with the current government.
While there has been no official confirmation or repudiation from the government, several media outlets have reported they they have confirmed the veracity of the report. The entire report has now been uploaded, and is worth reading in full (available here), especially because of the unvarnished and unsavory views and recommendations attached to the people involved:
That government ministers believe there is a need for a strategy “to neutralise the people who are writing against the government.”
That an interaction between cabinet ministers and journalists saw the group discussing how “around 75% of media persons were impressed by the leadership of Narendra Modi and ideologically aligned with the party.”
That suggestions to manage criticism of the government included:
The need for news to “carry a mixture of truth and untruth”
Color-coding journalists based on their level of support for the government, with the goal of supporting and promoting favorable journalists
Creating a pool of “spin doctors” and engaging with out-of-work journalists who are supportive of the government to help “project the government’s image positively,” and
“Constantly tracking” a list of 50 “negative influencers.
A few of those cited within the report have since claimed that their version of what happened in these meetings is different. Some have claimed there was no discussion about the government’s communication strategy, but that they had been invited for a briefing on the ongoing India-China border crisis (which did not take place as the External Affairs Minister never made it to the briefing). Other have claimed they did not say what was attributed to them, or that their views have been misrepresented. Some have said nothing.
However, what’s most interesting about this report is not some of the unsavory recommendations outlined therein, but about what it entirely ignores. Rohan Venkataramakrishnan makes this point very directly in his article about the report:
Indeed, the last 12 months have revealed many reasons for the government to re-evaluate its approach towards public outreach.
From the discriminatory targeting of Muslims during the Tablighi Jamaat incident that was later called out by the judiciary to the indecisive and often insensitive rhetoric around the migrant crisis in the face of the horrendously planned Covid-19 lockdown to the deeply disturbing endorsement of an unscientific Covid-19 “cure” by the health minister to the prime minister falsely claiming there had been no Chinese intrusions along the Line of Actual Control, there have been numerous episodes that quite evidently could have been handled better with more astute communication.
Unfortunately, none of these find mention in the report.
Rohan, in my opinion, hits the nail on the head. Certainly, the best PR comes from effective policy and governance. That’s certainly been the centerpiece of the campaign that brought this government to power in 2014. However, in its approach to manage criticism and PR, it has chosen not to engage meaningfully in good-faith discussions about its shortcomings on policy, and often times sought to paint those who oppose the government as “anti-national.”
Rather than employing unequivocally terrible tactics like color-coding journalists or constantly tracking negative influencers, the government needs to return to basics. That may mean taking a much more difficult, but holistically better approach. It means undertaking an honest introspection about the policy failures that contribute to the government’s negative PR rather than soliciting advice from a group of ideologically friendly yes-men and yes-women. It means seeing criticism on its policies as not as something to “neutralized” - either through the recommendations made in the report or through steps the government is already taking, like arresting journalists or filing cases against activists.
In short, it means recognizing that being in power means you will be criticized, often times fairly and often times, yes, unfairly. It means recognizing that using criticism constructively to establish the most effective policies for all the people of India is the most effective narrative a government can put forward.
News Roundup
Prime Minister Narendra Modi held a virtual bilateral summit with the Prime Minister of Sweden, Stefan Löfven, on March 5. The summit saw Sweden officially join the India-led International Solar Alliance, as well as commitments from both countries to advance cooperation in the fields of health, innovation, green recovery, smart cities, clean technologies, internet of things, smart grids, aviation knowledge, and financial services. The full joint statement is available here.
Bharat Biotech, the Indian biotechnology company behind the India’s indigenous COVID-19 vaccine Covaxin, released the preliminary data from its Phase III trials. The trials, which drew data from 25,800 participants, found that the vaccine demonstrated an interim clinical efficacy of 81%.
External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar visited Bangladesh on March 4, where he met with the Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasisna, and with the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dr A. K. Abdul Momen. The EAM’s visit lays the groundwork for Prime Minister Modi’s upcoming visit to Bangladesh, which is scheduled for March 26-27.
National Security Advisor Ajit Doval participated in the India – Nigeria Strategic and Counter-Terrorism Dialogue with his counterpart from Nigeria, Major General (Retd.) Babagana Monguno. The dialogue took place during the Nigerian NSA’s visit to India from March 4-5.
The Cabinet of India approved a Memorandum of Understanding between India and France aimed to promoting bilateral cooperation in the field of new and renewable energy. The MoU facilitates the exchange of scientific personnel and data, the organization of joint workshops, and the development of joint research projects.
News reports indicate that U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin will reportedly travel to India later this month as part of a tour of several Indo-Pacific countries. Such a visit would see the Secretary Austin engage in delegation-level talks with Defense Minister Rajnath Singh after the two ministers spoke on the phone shortly after Secretary Austin’s confirmation by the U.S. Senate.
The Ministry of Home Affairs has issued a notification on March 4, adding new limitations to the freedoms enjoyed by holders of the Overseas Citizen of India (OCI) card. Under the new rules, OCI card holders “shall be required to obtain a special permission or a Special Permit” in order to conduct research, undertake journalistic activities, participate in internships or employment in Indian diplomatic missions abroad, or engage in missionary activities. The notification, for the first time, also refers to OCI card holders as “foreign nationals,” rather than the prior designation of “non-resident Indians.” The complete notification is available here.
Indian Ambassador to Philippines, Shambu S. Kumaran, signed an “Implementation Agreement” with the Government of the Philippines that will paving the way for future government-to-government deals on defense equipment, such as the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile.
The Ministry of Power issued a new notification creating a new surcharge for late payments to power providers. The surcharge can increase by 0.5% of a defined “base rate,” and can be no bigger than 3% of the base rate. Should payments remain outstanding after seven months, the entity in default will be barred from procuring power until its bill are paid.
The Indian Air Force will participate in the multi-national Exercise Desert Flag, being hosted by the United Arab Emirates from March 3-27. Indian troops will participate alongside troops from the air forces of the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America, France, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Bahrain.
A new report from the Ministry of Urban Affairs argues that “the 74th Constitutional Amendment cannot adequately address the problems that face Indian cities today” and has recommended the introduction of a new constitutional amendment to ensure the financial autonomy of urban local governing bodies in India.
The governments of India and Norway have agreed to launch a new project in the area of marine spatial planning in the oceanic space, aimed at ensuring that human activities at sea take place in an efficient, safe, and sustainable manner in areas such as energy, transportation, fisheries, aquaculture, tourism. The two governments have agreed to focus on Lakshadweep and Puducherry as pilot sites for the project.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening:
Dr. Ashley Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Piece, reviews Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar’s book, The India Way: “The biggest threats to fecund cooperation often arise from mistaken expectations—with these dangers residing most conspicuously in Washington when U.S. policymakers, either elated by episodes of intensified cooperation or mesmerized by the mirage of a formal alliance, begin to envision India as an American confederate. Jaishankar’s masterly exposition confirms this to be an illusion. At a time when the Biden administration is developing its own Indo-Pacific strategy and reconsidering how New Delhi ought to be integrated into that design, The India Way should be indispensable reading because it proves that the intersection of the two nations’ self-interest—with all its possibilities as well as its limits—remains the surest foundation on which to sustain the ongoing transformation of U.S.-Indian relations.”
Prof. Ashwini Deshpande, professor of economics and founder-director of Centre for Economic Data and Analysis at Ashoka University, writes: “Women are not dropping out [of the labour force]. They are being pushed out by the lack of demand for their labour. There has been movement out of agriculture into informal and casual jobs, where the work is sporadic, and often less than 30 days at a stretch. The new modern sector opportunities, especially in high value-added service sectors, mostly accrue to men.”
Narayan Ramachandran, Chairman & CEO of KludeIn 1 Acquisition Corporation and a columnist at Mint, argues: “The sharp imbalance between the Centre and states, between states and local bodies, and even across states based on inclusiveness criteria like income distance, has the seeds of deep political discontent sown within it. Any [Finance Commission (FCs)] has the tough job of balancing inclusiveness for poorer states and incentives for states that perform. It is akin to giving rewards to both those who finish the race in the lead and those who are at the back of the pack. Unless FCs are able to take bold and far-reaching decisions that promote devolution and decentralization (required by the 73rd and 74th constitutional amendments), we will see deeper political divisions.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.