On India, Liberalism, and Foreign Policy
Do India's liberal democratic credentials, or lack thereof, affect its foreign relations with important partners?
Hi there, I’m Aman Thakker. Welcome to Indialogue, a newsletter analyzing the biggest policy developments in India. The aim of this newsletter is to provide you with quality analysis every week on what’s going on in India.
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India’s Liberal Democratic Character and What It Means For Its Foreign Relations
This week’s top story is a bit different than usual, since it largely centers around a loud and active brouhaha on Twitter and its implications for policy. If you are, unlike me, smartly stay far away from Twitter, let me catch you up.
Dr. Ashley Tellis, perhaps the most vocal defender of closer U.S.-India ties and one of the doyens of India and Asia policy in Washington D.C., published a piece, first for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and later republished this week for ThePrint, on India’s must “restore its economic momentum and liberal credentials” in order to play a bigger role on the world stage. He writes:
Unlike China, India has seen its rise widely welcomed: it proved that rapid growth could occur even in a liberal democratic society marked by sharp demographic heterogeneities and severe developmental challenges. In fact, the United States and many other Western powers jumped at the prospect of aiding India’s ascent, presuming that it would not misuse its power against its own citizens or its neighbors.
Yet a recent wave of policies widely perceived to be illiberal has eroded this confidence. Critics within and outside India point to many developments such as the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir’s autonomy, the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act, and the possibility of implementing a National Register of Citizens as evidence of a weakening commitment to liberalism. The government’s defenses of these moves have not satisfied India’s minority groups or others concerned about India’s direction. But more than government policy is at issue here: key Indian institutions are weakening dangerously, and important segments of the population appear disenchanted with their country’s liberal inheritance.
The community of liberal democracies internationally stands to lose if domestic unrest fueled by confrontational politics stymies India’s growth or if India enlarges its material capabilities only by sacrificing its liberal character. Either outcome would dilute the West’s eagerness to partner with India.
To be sure, India’s relevance in the Indo-Pacific will survive, thanks to the exigencies of balancing China. This ensures continued engagement by the United States and other powers, but a constrained acquiescence to partnership is a poor substitute for the enthusiastic boosting of India that would otherwise occur if its liberal credentials were not contested.
These are not new arguments from Ashley. He has advanced similar arguments in the past, as well as in the days after ThePrint republished his piece when he appeared on his colleague Dr. Milan Vaishnav’s great podcast, Grand Tamasha. (You can listen to Ashley’s comments on India’s liberal democratic character beginning at 31:01 here).
While I rarely try and let Twitter controversies drive the content of this newsletter, I thought to focus on this for two reasons. First, for anyone who follows the leading thinkers on India policy on Twitter, it was hard to escape the back-on-forth on Twitter regarding this issue.
But secondly, I think the pushback Ashley’s comments elicited, present some significant implications for India’s policy outlook. In reading them this week, I grouped these the responses to Ashley’s article in three largely distinct categories: denial, dismissal, and disdain. Let’s take them one at a time, and then unpack what they mean.
Those who deny Ashley’s arguments outright advance the argument that India has lost its so-called liberal character. In doing so, they tend to advance two arguments. One, the Narendra Modi-led BJP government was democratically elected on a platform to undertake the policies Ashley points out as eroding India’s liberal democratic credentials, such as the Citizenship Amendment Act, the planned National Registry of Citizens, and the revocation of Article 370. Secondly, they also suggest that these policies are a reversion to normal, after years of pseudo-secular and pseudo-liberal policies that have seen India prefer the minority over the majority.
However, such arguments overlook two key aspects. First, democracies aren’t simply about winning elections and using an electoral majority to advance majoritarian policies. Democracies, at their heart, preserve the rights of all citizens, and no majority, however large, can simply use its electoral victory to curb the rights and liberties of those in the minority. Secondly, many in India may even believe that this is a course correction, and a reversion away from what they believe to be pseudo-liberalism. But that can’t mean they reject the idea that others, within and outside India, retain their right to decry and criticize illiberal policies. Sticking their head in the sand and saying, “This is how it is, and this is real liberalism!” doesn’t win you any friends and allies in foreign policy, especially when its your friends and allies who giving you advice.
Then there are those who have dismissed Ashley’s arguments, saying there is very little to the idea that India’s policies, whether liberal and democratic or not, will affect its foreign relations. They point to China, arguing how for throughout China’s rise, human rights violations and illiberal policies were brushed aside in favor of engagement. India, too, with its size, economy, and geopolitical heft will remain a country with which others engage.
Here, it is important to consider Ashley’s arguments in their full context. Nowhere in Ashley’s piece is there even a suggestion that India’s turn to illiberalism will see the United States simply turn away from India. On the contrary, he notes that geopolitical and economic considerations will see India remain a relevant player in foreign affairs, and any country advancing its self-interest in Asia will need to engage India. However, it is the eagerness with which countries will engage India that can be deeply affected if India continues down an illiberal path. As he notes in his conversation with Milan Vaishnav, “while we ‘welcome’ China's rise, it was a welcome that was always laced with foreboding.” Clearly, it would be contrary to India’s self-interest for such foreboding to accompany its future rise, even if India remains a player in Asia and the world.
Finally, there are those who have reacted to Ashley’s comments with great disdain, tearing into the idea that an American scholar dare lecture India on liberal policies at a time when America faces its own challenges: from its failures to ensure that Black Lives Matter to rising inequality to active disenfranchisement of voters in, both, previous elections and the 2020 elections, they argue it is a bit rich for America and Americans to tell India how to run its polity.
However, this kind of “whataboutism” doesn’t take away from the reality that what India is doing is remains illiberal, and represents a fairly significant logical fallacy. Furthermore, while it is true that the United States has time and time again failed on race relations, or does woefully little to ensure every eligible voter gets their chance to vote doesn’t excuse India’s missteps. It doesn’t excuse India’s decision to instituting a curfew and a communications blackout in an entire former state, and lock up their politicians like in Jammu and Kashmir. It doesn’t excuse the Home Minister of India and former party President of the BJP calling Muslim immigrants “termites,” and suggesting that the combination of the CAA and NCR will be used to kick out unwanted immigrants. Whataboutism doesn’t help advance U.S.-India ties, or India’s foreign relations with any country or well-wisher that expresses concern about the turn India has made in its domestic policy.
Ashley’s arguments brings to the fore an important conversation, and that conversation must, of course, include room for those who disagree with him. There are valid questions about whether India’s liberal democratic credentials, or lack thereof, matter in its international relations, and if so, how and to what extent they have an impact. Rather than approaching Ashley’s arguments with dismissal, denial, disdain, and whataboutism, there’s a need to engage critically with what one of the smartest voices on U.S.-India relations has to say.
Or, as someone much smarter than me (and another of the smartest voices on U.S.-India relations) put it:
For More On This:
You can read Ashley’s full piece for Carnegie here: India’s Path to the Big Leagues
This piece by Dr. Paul Staniland of the University of Chicago situates Ashley’s comments in the wider literature within political science: 4 Questions on India, Liberalism, America, etc.
Dr. Aparna Pande’s insightful responses to questions on India and its liberal democratic credentials in this interview with Rohan Venkataramakrishnan: ‘We believe we will become a Great Power without effort’: Aparna Pande on India’s many challenges
This great thread on Twitter by Dr. Rohan Mukherjee: Are liberal democratic great powers less likely to partner with a liberal democratic rising power that seems to be losing its liberal character?
And an article of my own from February 2020 for The Diplomat: A Free and Open Indo-Pacific Needs a Free and Open India
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This Week in India and the Indo-Pacific
This week saw a flurry of activity from India on cooperation with key partners in the Indo-Pacific. These activities included:
The Indian Navy and the Royal Australian Navy conducted a Passage (PASSEX) in the Eastern Indian Ocean Region between September 23 and 24, 2020. The HMAS Hobart participated alongside the INS Sahyadri and INS Karmuk.
Prime Minister Modi called the newly-elected Prime Minister of Japan, Yoshihide Suga, on September 25, to congratulate him on his election and discuss the India-Japan Special Strategic & Global Partnership.
Senior officials from India’s Ministry of External Affairs joined their counterparts from Australia, Japan, and the United States on September 25 to discuss “regional and global issues of common interest.” India’s readout from the meeting is available here.
The Indian Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force commenced the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX) off the West Coast of India on September 26, 2020. The exercises were touted as “another example of bilateral efforts to secure a free, open, and inclusive #IndoPacific.” The exercises will conclude on Monday, September 28, 2020.
News Roundup
India crossed the six million mark of total confirmed cases of COVID-19, making it only the second country, after the United States, to reach six million. India added one million cases, rising from five to six million, in only 11 days.
India’s Parliament passed three pieces of legislation aimed at enacting labor reforms in India. The three bills are the Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, the Industrial Relations Code, and the Code on Social Security.
The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code consolidates 13 laws regarding worker health and safety, and regulates health and safety conditions of workers in establishments with 10 or more workers;
The Industrial Relations Code relaxes the need for companies who employ fewer than 300 workers to seek government permission to lay-off workers or close plants, and prohibits workers from striking without prior notice';
The Code on Social Security consolidates nine central government laws, extends welfare measures to new categories of workers, such as "gig-economy workers, “platform workers,” and unorganized workers.
Following the Sixth Meeting of Indian and Chinese Senior Commanders to stabilize the situation along the Line of Actual Control, both sides agreed to “earnestly implement the important consensus reached by the leaders of the two countries, strengthen communication on the ground, avoid misunderstandings and misjudgments, stop sending more troops to the frontline, refrain from unilaterally changing the situation on the ground, and avoid taking any actions that may complicate the situation.” They also agreed to hold a 7th meeting between the Senior Commanders “as soon as possible.”
The Election Commission of India announced the dates for the upcoming election to the Legislative Assembly of Bihar. Voting for the election will take place in three phases, which will be held on October 28th, November 3rd, and November 7th. Results are slated to be released on November 10th.
Prime Minister Modi held a virtual bilateral summit with the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, Mahinda Rajapaksa. The joint statement from their bilateral meeting is available here.
The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague has ruled in favor of telecommunications company Vodafone in its decade-long tax dispute with India. Indian income tax authorities has sought payment of $2.2 billion in capital gains tax for Vodafone International Holdings B.V.’s acquisition of a 67% stake in Indian telecom company Hutchison Essar Limited in 2007. A good overview of the dispute is available here.
The monsoon session of Parliament, which was delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and entered into session on September 14, concluded its proceedings 10 days later on September 24. During this session, 27 bills were passed by both houses of Parliament.
Prime Minister Modi will hold a virtual bilateral summit with his counterpart from Denmark, Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen, on September 28, 2020. During the summit, the two sides will sign a Memorandum of Understanding on intellectual property cooperation, and will also announced that Denmark will join the International Solar Alliance.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening:
Dr. Harsh Pant, director of research at Observer Research Foundation, and Shubhangi Pandey, Junior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, argue: “The fact that India is possibly the only country that can engage with the United States and Europe on the one hand, and Iran and Russia on the other, underscores its unique position to contribute to the Afghan peace process. While each country seeks to align its engagement policy to its respective strategic objectives, the overarching goal for all is peace in Afghanistan. A consensus among major international stakeholders about how to deal with the Taliban is of utmost importance—and India can help forge it and carry it out.”
Joanna Slater and Niha Masih, journalists at The Washington Post, write: “India has added more coronavirus cases in the past month than any other country during the pandemic. While much of the focus was on ventilators around the world during the earlier phase of the outbreak, the surge in India is now intensifying overall demand for oxygen and exposing the weak points in the system for getting it to hospitals. Officials around India are racing to increase supply and remove bottlenecks to prevent a repeat of the situation earlier this month when medical shortages were reported in several parts of the country, particularly in Mumbai and the surrounding Maharashtra state, the hardest-hit area in India.”
Lt. Gen. D.S. Hooda (retd.), former Northern Army Commander, and Lt. Gen. Rakesh Sharma, former commander, XIV Corps, in Leh, Ladakh, write: “A crucial question facing both countries is how to move forward to break the current deadlock. Our current approach to resolving the standoff is based on a process of disengagement and a return to status quo ante, followed by de-escalation in which additional forces inducted return to their permanent locations. As the situation eases, new confidence-building measures will be concluded to maintain and enhance peace and tranquility. This seems entirely logical, except that the very first action of disengagement remains stalled, impeding the overall process. To find a way around the impasse, both countries could perhaps look at a different approach to our diplomatic and military negotiations. We suggest a five-step approach, three to resolve the current crisis and two for a long-term resolution.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.