An App for That? Not If It's Chinese
Plus, the Prime Minister's surprise visit to Ladakh and a quick COVID-19 Update
Hi there, I’m Aman Thakker. Welcome to Indialogue, a newsletter analyzing the biggest policy developments in India. The aim of this newsletter is to provide you with quality analysis every week on what’s going on in India.
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India Bans 59 Chinese Apps As Talk of A Wider Decoupling from China Grows
On June 29, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology announced that the Government of India would ban 59 Chinese apps, including TikTok and WeChat, arguing they are “prejudicial to [the] sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of state and public order.” The decision comes as tensions between India and China continue to be high after the June 15 violent clash in the Galwan Valley, which led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers. A full list of the apps banned can be seen in the Appendix of this press release.
The government enforced this ban by invoking its power under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The ban will be enforced by internet service providers, who will soon receive instructions from the government if they have not already. Reportage from Business Insider finds that when they tried to load the TikTok app on the 4G networks for Jio and Airtel, the app failed to load. Some WiFi providers were still providing access to the app, suggesting the ban is being enforced in stages. Moreover, the 59 apps will also be blocked on app marketplaces such as GooglePlay and Apple’s App store, preventing Indians from downloading the app.
The ban has already had wide-ranging implications, from everyday Indian citizens to big Chinese companies to issues such as internet freedom and Indian economic dependence on China. For example, TikTok was widely popular in India, with a user base of over 100 million. Even lesser-known Chinese apps such as Helo, Likee, and Bigo Live were popular among the non-English speaking population of India, and who are now looking for substitutes. It is also likely that the decision will have a large impact on TikTok’s owner, ByteDance, with some reports suggesting that the economic costs of the ban to the company rising to as high as $6 billion.
However, the costs of the ban go beyond the economic, and have implications for rights and freedoms. Apar Gupta, the executive director of the Internet Freedom Foundation, explained how the decision was a “singular act of web censorship” that impacted “more Indians than ever before.” To be clear, there are serious concerns about the obligations of Chinese internet companies to turn over data under China’s 2017 Cybersecurity Law. However, such bans on app usage, particularly which rest on claims of national security, should ideally emanate from a legal framework that balances privacy, security, and economic costs while outlining well-defined criteria for how all companies (not just Chinese companies) should collect and store data, and what the punishments will be if they fail to do so. This episode underscored just how far India is from having such a framework, and how, if misused, such bans could infringe on rights and civil liberties.
Finally, the decision comes as part of a broader context of a growing Indian desire to reduce India’s overall economic dependence on China. “Decoupling from China,” in this sense, calls for an overall reduction across all industry to raw materials, finished products, services, and other imports from China in the hope that local Indian business may flourish. In fact, calls on social media have called upon Indians to delete TikTok in the hope that these Chinese apps will be replaced with homegrown ones that provide the same function.
Indian government bodies, from the center to the state governments, have so far led the way so far in this effort to “decouple.” The Union Ministry of Urban Development has stated that a rapid-rail project between the capital city of Delhi to Meerut, for which the Chinese firm Shanghai Tunnel Engineering Company was the lowest bidder, remains “under process.” Meanwhile, the state of Bihar cancelled a tender for a “mega bridge” in Patna because two of the four partners involved had Chinese partners. Finally, last week the Indian state-owned telecommunications company BSNL cancelled a tender to upgrade the existing 4G network across 47,000 sites and building new capability in Delhi and Mumbai for which Chinese firm ZTE, in partnership with Nokia, had bid.
However, this de-coupling may not be easy, or in India’s interest. Here’s James Crabtree, associate professor of practice at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, in his latest for Foreign Policy:
Some of these steps are appropriate, if targeted carefully. India should aspire to make more of its own electronics and drug ingredients and would be more secure if it could build 5G telecoms networks without Chinese parts. It also needs to be wary of the threat of Chinese future economic coercion if relations between the two powers worsen, for instance the risk that Beijing might in future limit exports of pharmaceutical inputs, just as it recently imposed punitive tariffs on Australian crop exports after a diplomatic spat.
Yet all these steps also come with costs, at a time when India’s battered economy is already struggling. India’s potentially vast consumer market is attractive to Chinese companies, and its tech sector has attracted funds from Chinese investors. But arbitrary import restrictions or consumer boycotts will be largely self-defeating.
And, crucially, they are unlikely to deter China from further aggressive military actions in future.
The real risks of launching a mini trade war against China are longer-term… India will struggle to compete militarily with China until it finds a way to rekindle an economy that was sputtering badly even before the calamity of COVID-19. Genuine security considerations might warrant some modest, carefully targeted restrictions on trade with China. But this means India will also need to work harder to build trading ties with other nations, and especially so elsewhere in Asia. Balancing China abroad and deterring it domestically is a long-term project, and one that needs money to fund military expansion at home. And if India is to develop a wider range of strategic relationships with nations like Australia, Japan, and South Korea as part of a plan to counter China, it will also need to be underpin these with stronger economic ties.
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Prime Minister Modi Visits Ladakh as India-China Standoff Cross Two Month Mark
On July 3, Prime Minister Narendra Modi made a surprise visit to Leh, Ladakh, to interact with Indian soldiers posted in the region. The visit, which came nearly two weeks after 20 Indian soldiers died after a violent clash with Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley, was seen as a symbolic message to China. In an address to the troops, the Prime Minister hit out at China without naming it, saying:
Friends, the era of colonial expansion is over; this is the era of evolution. Evolution is only relevant in rapidly changing times. It is an opportunity for development and development is also the basis for the future. In the previous centuries expansionism has done the greatest harm to humanity and has tried to destroy humanity. The obsession with expansion has always posed a threat to world peace.
And friends, let's not forget, history is a witness to the fact that such forces have been erased or have forced to relent. The world has always had this experience and on the basis of this experience, the whole world now has made up its mind against the policy of expansion. Today the world is devoted to development and is welcoming the open competition for development.
The stand-off, the first reports of which were reported on May 5, are now past the two month mark, and with tensions remaining high, if not rising. A third round of meeting of the Corps Commanders from India and China, which was held on July 1 in Chushul, was unable to break the impasse despite going on for nearly 11 hours. Sources from the Indian Army told Krishn Kaushik of The Indian Express that more meetings would be needed to reach a resolution, but that the Army was “preparing for the long haul and the standoff is expected to continue well into the winter.”
Such preparations for the long-haul come as the list of “friction points” continues to grow. In addition to the areas where stand-offs have been underway for months, such as Pangong Lake, Hot Springs, and the Galwan Valley, the Chinese have amassed troops and even attempted to cross the LAC at Depsang Plains. Indian analysts are also increasingly concerned about a two-front confrontation, with reports that Pakistan has mobilized 20,000 troops to the Line of Control near northern Ladakh.
As Indialogue covered last week, India has mirrored the Chinese deployments in Ladakh , bringing in additional troops as well deploying new air defense system in Ladakh. However, this week, India has also approved the purchase of various defense platforms totaling Rs. 38,600 crore ($5.17 billion). The purchases include several indigenous platforms, as well as fighter jets from Russia. A rough breakdown below:
Rs. 20400 crore ($2.73 billion) towards:
Pinaka missle system, plus armament upgrades and software for the Indian Army
Long Range Land Attack Cruise Missiles and Astra Missiles for the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force
Rs. 7,418 crore ($993 million) towards:
21 MiG-29 aircraft
Upgrades for 59 MiG-29 aircraft
Rs. 10,730 crore ($1.43 billion) towards 12 Su-30 MKI aircraft from Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
A Quick COVID-19 Update
Infections of COVID-19 in India continue to rise, as India recorded over 22,000 new cases - its highest single-day spike in confirmed cases of COVID-19 - on July 4.
The spike in cases has been from India’s western and southern states, specifically Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh.
While official data puts Russia and India currently neck-and-neck as having the 3rd and 4th highest cases of COVID-19 respectively, state-level data from the weekend suggests that India will soon overtake Russia to take the 3rd highest spot.
The Indian Council on Medical Research (ICMR) directed clinical trial sites for a vaccine named Covaxin “to fast-track approvals, and outlined an ambitious target to have a vaccine, saying “It is envisaged to launch the vaccine for public use by latest August 15th.” However, there is no evidence so far that the vaccine is either effective or safe for human humans.
After much backlash, the ICMR issued a clarification saying the letter outlining the August 15 target date was “meant to cut unnecessary red tape, without bypassing any necessary process, and speed up recruitment of participants.”
In Other News
The July meeting of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council will likely see states demand that the post of Vice-Chairman of the Council, which has remained vacant since the Council was created in 2017, be filled as soon as possible. Opposition-ruled states will also likely demand that a state finance minister from a non-BJP ruled state be nominated. All states will also unanimously demand that no changes be made to the guaranteed 14 percent rate of compensation for GST revenue shortfalls. Estimates indicate that revenue collections in 2020-21 are projected to be 1/3rd less than the revenues collected in 2019-20, leading to a shortfall of Rs. 2,67,000 crore ($35.75 billion) for the states.
The Home Ministry declared nine individuals as terrorists under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act due to “their support to and involvement in the Khalistan Movement.” Four of the named individuals are based in Pakistan, while two are based in Germany, and one each in United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom.
Sanjay Bhattacharya, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and India’s Sherpa for BRICS grouping, participated in a videoconference with sherpas of Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa to discuss “tremendous potential of organization, progress on projects, new ideas.”
The Indian Air Force held its bi-annual Senior Air Staff Officers (SASO) meeting by videoconference on July 2 and 3. The meetings are designed to facilitate discussions on operational capability enhancements, training, and automation efforts.
The presumptive Democratic nominee for President and former Vice President, Joe Biden, said in a virtual fundraiser that India was a “natural partner” of the United States, and that strengthening strategic ties with India would be a high priority should he be elected President.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening.
Darshana Baruah, nonresident scholar with the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and visiting fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Tokyo, writes: “The rise of China and its expanding collaborations in India’s neighborhood have raised considerable concerns for New Delhi’s political calculations. The recognition of a new player in its area of strategic interest and an unfolding Sino-Indian competition have led to a revision in India’s foreign policy interactions. Faced with new geopolitical challenges, New Delhi has quickly realized that it lacks resources and capacity to respond to a new security environment. New Delhi understands the potential of partnerships in addressing these challenges through shared visions and goals.”
Dr. Christopher Clary, assistant professor of political science at the University at Albany, State University of New York, and Dr. Vipin Narang, associate professor of political science and member of the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, argue: “India finds itself in a very difficult position vis-à-vis China on their disputed border. At some point, India will have to determine how it could have allowed China to surprise it and execute faits accomplis in multiple places, and what the strategic and operational warning signs were that it missed or failed to act upon. But, at the moment, its immediate challenge is to stop the bleeding, which in and of itself has all the ingredients for a tense and potentially long and escalatory standoff between Asia’s two nuclear-armed giants. Even if it can halt additional gains by the Chinese military, New Delhi may find it difficult to restore the status quo, since its options range from bad to worse to ugly.”
Dr. Milan Vaishnav, senior fellow and director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes: “It is in the realm of foreign contributions where the hypocrisy of political elites is the most apparent. In 2014, the Delhi high court found both the BJP and the Congress guilty of accepting donations from several foreign corporations. In 2016, these two rivals set aside their bitter differences to bail one another out by amending the 2010 Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) to retroactively redefine what a “foreign source” was under the law. Rather than face the consequences, the two parties conspired to simply reclassify previously designated foreign companies as “Indian” with the stroke of a pen..”
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