India and China Still Eyeball-to-Eyeball
A look at three key flashpoints in Ladakh suggests the situation remains complicated
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After the Violent Clashes in Ladakh, Are India and China Really Deescalating?
Since India and China engaged in a violent clash in the Galwan Valley River on the night of June 15, military and diplomatic representatives from both countries have discussed how both sides can deescalate the situation along the Line of Actual Control.
On June 22, Corps Commanders from India and China - who had earlier agreed to a limited “deescalation” during their first meeting on June 6 - met for nearly 11 hours and arrived at a “mutual consensus” to disengage. This agreement was followed up by a videoconference between the Joint Secretary (East Asia) from India’s Ministry of External Affairs and Director General of the Department of Boundary & Oceanic Affairs from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination (WMCC) on India-China Border Affairs.
However, despite these steps towards deescalation, reporters and analysts have pointed out that there is evidence at three key points: the Galwan Valley, Pangong Lake, and Depsang Plains, that complicates whether a deescalation is actually underway. So let’s take each of these locations one at a time to understand what might be happening.
1. Galwan River Valley
The Galwan River Valley, the site of the violent clashes between Indian and Chinese, remains at the forefront of tensions between the two countries. The clashes took place because, as the Indian side describes the events, a Chinese camp continued to be in place in the Galwan River Valley despite the June 6 agreement for both sides to move back by one kilometer in that area.
The mutual consensus to disengage reached on June 22, which built upon that previous June 6 agreement, would involve “stage-wise disengagement process will also involve shifting of military camps and reduction in strength of soldiers on both sides.” However, Nathan Ruser, satellite imagery expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, found that China has continued to maintain its camps and structures at a strategic location in the Galwan River Valley.
A more detailed photo shows the extent of Chinese camps (from this source):
These images clearly highlight two key things: that the Chinese build-up is significant in the Galwan River Valley (especially in contrast to India’s camps in the region), and that disengagement, which would involve dismantling these camps, will remain a complicated process. Any process for disengagement would involve the Chinese breaking these camps down, which is what India has repeatedly called on the Chinese to do. Otherwise, India would either need to deploy force to dismantle these installations itself (risking a war), or accept the new status quo (a serious setback).
It should be noted that there has been push-back to the idea whether these are Chinese camps at all. Nitin Gokhale, who is a well-renowned defense expert, has said these camps are actually Indian.
But even this notion needs to assessed critically:
Clearly, the situation at the Galwan River Valley will continue to remain a key focal point in these latest round of border hostilities. And they will be only further complicated by China’s newly articulated claims on the Galwan Valley. As Indialogue discussed last week, the People’s Liberation Army has claimed that “The sovereignty of the Galwan River Valley has always been ours.” However, as former Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao notes, there is a historical record to keep in mind:
2. Pangong Lake
Don’t sleep yet on Pangong Lake! The situation here likely remains one of the most serious points of contention between India and China, as well as analysts within India. For those new to this particular point in the ongoing stand-off, the dispute basically comes down to the “Fingers” (the name given to the slopes of the mountains which jut into the lake). Below is a helpful map of the Fingers on Pangong Lake:
While India has claimed that the area until Finger 8 is Indian territory, China claims that the border is actually Finger 4. Despite these claims, retired Indian military professionals have stated that India would routinely patrol until Finger 8 until this latest stand-off with China. Since the stand-offs began around May 5, China has occupied the area until Finger 4, set up “permanent bunkers, pillboxes and observation posts between Fingers Four and Eight,” and has prevented those routine Indian patrols. So serious was this development that prior to the June 15 clash in Galwan, Pangong Lake was key point of concern for Indian strategists.
It arguably remains so even today, with Northern Army commander Lieutenant General DS Hooda (retd) saying:
The PLA has already forced a change in the LAC on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso. Chinese soldiers are currently in physical occupation of areas along with their perception of the LAC and have constructed numerous posts. The biggest challenge during our negotiations going forward will be to get the Chinese to restore the status quo ante in this area.
It is this goal - restoring the status quo ante in this area - that will be tough given these Chinese installations between Finger 4 and Finger 8. Just as the installations in Galwan, India has pushed the Chinese to adhere to the disengagement consensus. But it remains to be seen whether China will do so, and whether the status quo can be restored.
And efforts to restore the status quo will continue to be complicated if the reportage of latest Chinese actions is to be believed. Indeed, Sushant Singh of The Indian Express has reported that:
An official told The Indian Express, “It is correct that the Chinese have started consolidating their positions on the north bank of Pangong Tso lake. There is a helipad that is now being constructed in the Finger 4 area, which is in addition to all the other infrastructure construction done by them in past eight weeks or so.”
“PLA patrols are now regularly making small forays down the ridge of Finger 3 towards the bank of the lake and then returning to the ridge. They are essentially asking us to move back to Finger 2,” the official said.
A second official said this meant that “the Chinese are telling us that they have no intention of going back or restoring the status quo as in April. It is why they have not been interested in discussing any disengagement or de-escalation in Pangong Tso.”
However, these developments have also been questioned. As Lt Gen Prakash Menon, former military advisor at India’s National Security Council Secretariat argues:
Again, we’ll need to critically analyze and engage with claims being made (which is not a reflection on the reporters or their sources, but just the nature of the game given the sensitivity, the remote location, and the reality of strategic leaking). But the situation in Pangong Lake remains serious.
3. Depsang Plains
Finally, reports this week also suggested that China has opened a new front with India as well. Sushant Singh of The Indian Express reports:
As India and China grapple with rising tensions in the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Pangong Tso on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Chinese army has crossed the border in another strategic area to the north, the Depsang plains. This intrusion is seen as another attempt by the Chinese to shift the LAC further west on the disputed boundary.
Such an ingress would affect strategic areas from an Indian perspective. It would bring the Chinese uncomfortably close to the newly built Darbuk-Shyok-Daulet Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road, which vital to support and supply Indian troops in the area, and provide the Chinese new territory close to India’s airfield at Daulet Beg Oldie (DBO).
Again, if these reports are true, then it suggests that here, too, disengagement is not really how we would describe the situation along the Line of Actual Control. It’s important not to rush to conclusions at this stage, but it will be important to keep an eye on Chinese activities in this new area of tension.
Developments in Air Defense
However, as this process is underway, India has taken a number of steps. A report from Asian News International has stated that India has deployed the Akash missile system, a “quick-reaction surface-to-air missile defense system” in Ladakh. India’s defense minister, Rajnath Singh, also visited Moscow this week to participate in Victory Day Parade. During that trip, it was reported that the Minister pressed Russia to speed up delivery of the S-400 missile defense system to India, as well ensure other contracts do not face delays.
Two Must-Watch Suggestions:
This week, I watched these two videos while keeping a notebook open furiously taking notes, making these must-watch videos that I hope you’ll consider watching this week.
The Sino-Indian Border: Escalation & Disengagement: Dr. Rudra Chaudhuri, Director of Carnegie India, moderations this discussion with Dr. Ashley Tellis, Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Amb. Gautam Bambawale, former Indian Ambassador to China:
India-China Situation is Improving, Not Deteriorating as the Media Suggests: Karan Thapar of The Wire in conversation with Lt. Gen. S. L. Narasimhan, member of the National Security Advisory Board and Director General of the Centre for Contemporary China Studies:
Further reading:
Nitin Pai, Director of the Takshashila Institution: Power is the only currency that will work in dealing with China
Dr. Tanvi Madan, , Senior Fellow and director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution: China Is Losing India
Arjun Subramaniam, retired Air Vice Marshal of the Indian Air Force: Air Power in Joint Operations: A Game Changer in a Limited Conflict with China
Akriti Vasudeva, Research Associate at the Stimson Center: Shedding the Dogmas in India’s China Policy
Dr. Zorawar Daulet Singh, Adjunct Fellow at the Institute of China Studies, New Delhi: How India can keep China in check
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In Other News
The Ministry of External Affairs announced that it has asked the Government of Pakistan to reduce its staff strength in Pakistan’s High Commission in Delhi by 50%, and that India will similarly reduce its staff strength by half in its High Commission in Islamabad. The decision came after the Ministry “repeatedly expressed concern about… acts of espionage” and “dealings with terrorist organizations” by Pakistan High Commission officials.
The Ministry of Commerce and Industry has mandated that sellers on the Government e-Marketplace (GeM) must provide information about their products’ country of origin. The move is designed to promote the Make in India and AtmaNirbhar Bharat (Self-Reliant India) initiatives.
The government is reportedly planning to call Parliament into session for a two-week monsoon session, meeting on alternate days, from the last week of August to the first week of September. The last session of Parliament - the budget session - was adjourned on March 23 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. According to the Constitution, there should not be more than a six-month gap between any two sessions of Parliament.
Reports indicate that the government will likely release a second draft of its e-commerce policy. This latest draft of the policy is likely to focus on “domestic traders and have more scrutiny on predatory pricing,” as well as outline the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade’s “own set of recommendations on data localisation and non-personal data, independent of those laid out in the Personal Data Protection Bill 2019.”
The presumptive Democratic nominee for President and former Vice President, Joe Biden, has released a new policy paper titled “Joe Biden’s Agenda for Muslim-American Communities,” which calls upon the Indian government to “take all necessary steps to restore rights for all the people of Kashmir” and expresses his disappointment with “the measures that the government of India has taken with the implementation and aftermath of the National Register of Citizens in Assam and the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act into law.”
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening.
Dr. Sumit Ganguly, distinguished professor of political science and the Rabindranath Tagore chair in Indian cultures and civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues: “As India manages the fallout from its deadly clash with China last week—the first border skirmish in which there were troop fatalities since 1975—it would do well to take a step back and assess its broader regional situation. And if it does so, New Delhi would realize that its problems are by no means limited to Beijing: India’s relations with each of its neighbors are in shambles.”
Amy Kazmin, Stephanie Findlay, Benjamin Parkin, and Jyotsna Singh, all from The Financial Times, report: “New Delhi is delaying the clearance of Chinese imports a week after 20 of its soldiers were killed in a border clash with People’s Liberation Army troops... New Delhi does not appear to have issued any formal order stipulating that all Chinese imports should be physically inspected. Rajesh Malhotra, a finance ministry spokesman, told the Financial Times that he had “no information as of now on this issue”. However, a large western tech company said businesses were facing hold-ups “at different levels at different ports” for imports of finished products and components for assembly of goods in India.”
Dr. Constantino Xavier, Fellow at Brookings India, writes: “To be fair, India has slowly embraced the strategic logic of economic and infrastructure connectivity in the region. In Nepal, it is still struggling to finish a road renovation project it promised almost 20 years ago, but it has completed a new cross-border oil pipeline in a record 15 months, ahead of time. There are also unprecedented investments in integrated border checkposts, railway links and inland waterways that will now truly make the India-Nepal border open. It is this new economic and connectivity approach to Nepal and the neighbourhood that will best serve India's interests, and also not let the region slide into Chinese control.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.