What to Make of the Second "Quad" Ministerial
The foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met in Tokyo this week.
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What to Make of the Second "Quad" Ministerial
On Monday, October 6, the foreign ministers of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States met in Tokyo in what was a highly anticipated meeting of the “Quad.” Let’s dive in to a brief history of the Quad, what happened at the meeting, and what to make of the meeting and the Quad going forward.
1. A Brief History of the Quad
In 2004, Australia, India, Japan, and the United States came together to manage the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. This grouping, focused on this narrow mission in 2004 and ceased quadrilateral engagement after the tsunami response, continued to persist as an idea among strategists. By 2006, then-Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, on a state visit to Japan with his newly-elected counterpart, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, noted, in a joint statement, the “usefulness of having dialogue among India, Japan and other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific region on themes of mutual interest.” With the United States and Australia making up these “other like-minded countries in the Asia-Pacific,” the Quad was born.
By 2007, the Quad had two components. The first was diplomatic - an informal meeting of officials from all four countries on the sidelines of the East Asia Summit in Manila. The second was military - a joint exercise involving all four countries, as well as Singapore, under the aegis of the then-bilateral U.S.-India MALABAR Exercise (Japan, Australia, and Singapore were invited as “non-permanent partners” in 2007; MALABAR was officially upgraded to a trilateral exercise in 2015, when Japan became a “permanent partner.”)
However, by 2008, the Quad was comatose. Partly, domestic political compulsions forced the countries to take a step back from the Quad. Prime Minister Abe - seen as the driving force behind the grouping - resigned his position in September 2007. Prime Minister Singh faced backlash from the left flank of his domestic political alliance over growing U.S.-India ties as well as the Quad. However, the Quad was ultimately put down after Australian officials, sensitive to China’s vocal concerns over the Quad, declared that they “would not be proposing to have a dialogue of that nature” again.
In the years since, the idea of resurrecting the Quad has continued to linger, gaining speed in recent years. Since 2008, India has deepened its ties with all three countries through a variety of bilateral and trilateral mechanisms. The rise of China, and its increasingly assertive behavior that has threatened key interests of all four countries, has also given additional impetus to restart the group. On Nov. 12, 2017, nearly a full decade after the first informal meeting of the Quad, the four countries announced that officials from all four countries had met to discuss “issues of common interest in the Indo-Pacific region.”
2. Outcomes of the Ministerial Meeting
Since November 2017, the Quad has continued to meet regularly at the official level, such as in June 2018, November 2018, May 2019, November 2019, and September 2020. However, the four countries have also elevated the dialogue to the ministerial level, meeting for the first time on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2019, and for the second time this week in Tokyo.
The latest meeting of the Quad saw each country issue individual readouts from the discussions. India’s statement was largely divided into two sections: discussions related to the COVID-19 pandemic, and discussion on “regional issues of mutual interest. On COVID-19, the four countries discussed the “post Covid-19 international order,” financial problems from the pandemic, sharing of best practices, increasing supply chain resilience, and ensuring access to affordable vaccines and medicine. Beyond COVID-19, they discussed, connectivity, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), maritime safety and security, health security, and counter terrorism.
However, the individual press releases also had small, but important differences. Abhijnan Rej at The Diplomat has done a yeoman’s service breaking down the key differences:
Only the United States and Australia mentioned the need for the Quad to work toward countering disinformation.
Australia’s statement alone mentioned the need for regional powers to conform to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea. It was also the only statement that made an explicit reference to rules and norms in the region.
Japan explicitly named North Korea and the East and South China Seas as regional affairs that were discussed. The United States’ readout noted that the ministers “reviewed recent strategic developments across the Indo-Pacific.” The Indian readout too mentioned that “regional issues of mutual interest” were discussed. In omitting a similar reference, Australia was the odd one out in this regard.
India’s readout did not mention the need for the Quad to pursue cooperation around quality infrastructure. This is not surprising given that India is not part of the Trilateral Partnership for Infrastructure Investment established by the other three in 2018.
Japan’s statement alone noted the positive role of extra-regional powers (in its case, European countries) in maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
The Indian and Australian readouts explicitly mentioned cooperation around access to COVID-19 vaccines. Japan’s made an indirect reference, by way of Quad “cooperation in the areas of health and hygiene.” Perhaps it doesn’t come as particular surprise that United States’ readout omitted any similar reference.
India’s readout was the only one that omitted any reference to cybersecurity and data issues.
3. The Quad Going Forward
With every meeting of the Quad comes the barrage of questions about what the Quad is, expectations for what the Quad ought to be doing, and criticisms of the Quad either doing too much or too little. Some have dismissed the Quad as a “talk-shop” that has no institutional or military components. Others suggest that the Quad lacks a function or a substantive purpose. China has vocally hit out at the Quad, describing at a U.S.-led containment effort that could resemble an Asian NATO. However, there’s also been pushback to these charges.
In the midst of this back and forth, it is important to keep three crucially important aspects of the Quad in mind. First, India (and arguably all four members of the Quad) see the grouping as simply one of several groupings as part of its free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific strategy. As Dhruva Jaishankar, Director of the U.S. Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation has written, “It’s helpful to examine the Quad less as a bloc of four countries and more as a matrix of trilateral and bilateral relationships.”
Second, it is important to keep expectations from the Quad realistic. The Quad is rooted in convergences and shared interests between the four countries, rather than an alliance or four countries speaking in one, united, unified voice. Such an approach has value - allowing the countries to cooperate in areas where all four have an interest, such as connectivity, counter-terrorism, supply chain resilience, and, yes, information sharing on Chinese capabilities and intentions.
Finally, the lack of a formal alliance structure doesn’t take away from the Quad’s ability to burden share on key areas of strategic importance in Asia or the Indo-Pacific. While much hay has been made of India’s resistance to alliances, it not clear that any of the four members of the Quad see the group as an “alliance.” Rather, the Quad can serve as a mechanism to increase trust, improve and expand cooperation, and set the tone for other such regional groupings, such as a SQuad (Quad + Singapore) or the Quad+ (the Quad + other regional players such as Indonesia, Vietnam, or South Korea, to name just a few).
Expert Voices
Dr. Tanvi Madan, Senior Fellow and Director of the India Project at the Brookings Institute: What you need to know about the “Quad,” in charts
Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies at National University of Singapore: Confusion reigns on what the Quad is and its future in India’s international relations
Salvatore Babones, adjunct scholar at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney and an associate professor at the University of Sydney: India Doesn’t Need the Quad to Counter China—and Neither Do Its Partners
Tara Kartha, former director, National Security Council Secretariat: Jaishankar’s bland speech at Quad said nothing. But look at the naval ties India is forging
Shyam Saran, former foreign secretary of India: Another step forward by Quad
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Recommendation Corner: Two Great New Newsletters
One of my favorite aspects of writing this newsletter is to read and engage with many of the incredible fellow newsletter writers who approach India from their own unique vantage points. This week, I was delighted to see two such great writers start their own newsletters, and highly recommend subscribing to both.
Vivan Marwaha, author of the forthcoming book What Millennials Want (out in 2021), has a brand new newsletter called Rising India, which “will feature interviews with entrepreneurs, business leaders, and policymakers to devise out-of-the-box solutions to harness the potential of Indian millennials.” The first edition of his newsletter - an interview with Sanjeev Bikhchandani, Founder of naukri.com and investor in Zomato and PolicyBazaar - is already out, and available to read here.
Bansari Kamdar, a journalist who has written for The Boston Globe, The Diplomat, The Huffington Post, and several other publications has launched a new newsletter titled Newspaperwali. Her newsletter, which comes out every two weeks, will focus on gender and policy issues across South Asia, with reading suggestions and more. Her first edition - on the history of women in power in South Asia - is out now and available to read here.
The Latest on India-China Tensions
The 7th meeting of Indian and Chinese military commanders began earlier today, October 12.
The Indian side is led by 14 Corps Commander Lt Gen. Harinder Singh. Joint Secretary (East Asia) Naveen Srivastava will also participate.
There will be a key personnel change on the Indian side moving forward. Beginning October 14, Lt. Gen. Singh will take over as Commandant of the Indian Military Academy. As such, for future meetings between Indian and Chinese commanders, Lt. Gen. Singh’s successor, Lt. Gen. P.G.K. Menon, will lead the discussions.
Expectations are low for this 7th meeting of military commanders. One Army source told Krishn Kaushik of The Indian Express that “there is no expected breakthrough of a peace deal.”
Despite two major attempts to push forward on a disengagement process - one in the aftermath of the July 15 fatal clash between Indian and Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley, and another following the September 10 meeting of Indian and Chinese foreign ministers in Moscow - there has been little change to the situation on the ground, with Indian and Chinese troops only a few hundred meters apart in some areas (such as the north bank of Pangong Tso and in Chushul).
The weather is increasingly becoming a factor - temperatures in Ladakh have already fallen to -10° Celsius, and as winter settles in, temperatures will fall further.
Some reports have indicated that China is taking steps to dig in and maintain its positions despite the falling temperatures. The Hindustan Times reported one senior official as saying that “Given that both sides are deployed at nearly 18,000 feet on finger 4 and the weather is deteriorating, the PLA is rotating 200 troops at a time so that front-line troops are fresh and motivated. This clearly means that PLA has no plans to disengagement at least this winter.”
News Roundup
India crossed the 7 million mark in confirmed cases of COVID-19, registering 74,383 cases and 918 deaths during a 24-hour period this past weekend. Public health experts believe that India will overtake the United States, which currently has the highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases at nearly 7.7 million, in the next few weeks.
Following the 42nd Meeting of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Council, the Council issued a number of recommendations related to the ongoing dispute between the Centre and states over compensation for loss of revenue under the GST for states.
The Council has recommended that the center’s obligation to compensate the states for a transition period of five years be extended for “such period as may be required to meet the revenue gap.”
The Council also recommended that the Centre releasing compensation of Rs. 20,000 crore ($2.7 billion) to States to compensate for loss of revenue during FY2020-21.
Dinakar Peri of The Hindu reports that the Indian Navy will conduct a Passage Exercise (PASSEX) with the USS Ronald Reagan today, October 12, as it transits through the Indian Ocean. The Indian Navy conducted a similar PASSEX earlier this year in July with the USS Nimitz carrier strike group near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs approved a new Natural Gas policy titled “Natural Gas Marketing Reforms.” The policy “aims to provide standard procedure for sale of natural gas in a transparent and competitive manner” by allowing gas producers to through a uniform, open, and transparent bidding process.
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new "Interim Final Rule" on H1-B visas. This new rule narrows the definition of “specialty occupation” for eligibility for the visa, require companies to make “‘real’ offers to ‘real’ employees,” and empower the DHS to enforce compliance with these rules. Indian applicants make up approximately 73.9% of H1-B petitions, and will be impacted by these rule changes.
The Cabinet approved a Memorandum of Cooperation with Japan that would deepen cooperation in the area of cybersecurity. Specifically, the two countries would work together on initiatives, such as: capacity building in the area of cyberspace, protection of critical infrastructure, cooperation in emerging technologies, sharing of information on cyber security threats/incidents and malicious cyber activities, and sharing of best practices to counter cyber threats.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening:
Sushant Singh, former deputy editor at The Indian Express, argues: “The border crisis has snowballed into an intractable political, diplomatic, and economic challenge for Modi. He can’t accept Beijing’s aggression in the region without denting his own nationalist strongman credentials, but he can’t stand up to China militarily without making enormous investments in his military—investments that are impossible in the midst of an economic crisis. Modi could enlist external friends and allies, both in the region and globally, to put pressure on China, but that risks deviating from India’s long-standing commitment to “strategic autonomy”—that is, a foreign policy of self-reliance that doesn’t forge close alliances with great powers. And courting allies may be a little harder for India after Modi’s domestic policies, which have often channeled the Hindu nationalist politics of his political base, have reduced India’s attractiveness as a liberal, secular democracy. Modi, the most powerful ruler India has had in decades, now faces a moment of reckoning.”
Suhasini Haider, National Editor and Diplomatic Affairs Editor at The Hindu, interviewed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, Afghanistan’s Chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, who welcomed India’s participation in negotiations with the Taliban and said: “All the countries of the region, in the neighbourhood, are being affected because of the continuation of the war in Afghanistan. A peaceful Afghanistan will be an opportunity, so India will be further engaged there. I didn’t have a specific recommendation as far as engagement with the Taliban is concerned, but I will say India will be playing an important role, active role with the rest of the partners of the international community from the region [in the process] and beyond.”
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University, argues: “Although there are many questionable assumptions underlying the Indian strategic policy that must be probed, two are particularly important. The first is the assumption that all disagreements are the result of misunderstandings and misperceptions that can be resolved through dialogue... The second mistaken underlying assumption in India’s policy is that deliberate use of military force is somehow distasteful, not something that decent, ‘responsible’ countries do.”
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