Takeaways from U.S. SECDEF Austin's India Trip
Plus, reflections on the resignation of Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, and rising concerns over a possible second wave of COVID-19 infections in India
Hi there, I’m Aman Thakker. Welcome to Indialogue, a newsletter analyzing the biggest policy developments in India. The aim of this newsletter is to provide you with quality analysis every week on what’s going on in India.
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Takeaways from U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s Visit to India
From March 19-21, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited India as part of his first international visit since taking office. The visit to India comes as part of a broader Indo-Pacific swing that included the Secretary visiting Japan and South Korea, holding 2+2 dialogues on both countries along with Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
During his stay in India, Secretary Austin met with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Defense Minister Rajnath Singh, National Security Advisor Ajit Doval, and External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, among other officials.
The visit underscored the extent to which defense and security ties have been the driving force of deepening U.S.-India ties over the last twenty years. Under the Modi government, both countries have made steady progress on the signing of the “foundational” agreements on defense, focusing on logistics and supplies (the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement), on communications (Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement), and on sharing of geospatial data (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement). The United States has operationalized India’s status as a “Major Defense Partner” by placing it on the Tier 1 level of the U.S. Strategic Trade Authorization (STA) license exception, and signings an Industrial Security Annex with India to promote private sector collaboration on defense technology. These steps, along with growing alignment between both countries on security interests in the Indo-Pacific, have led to defense sales reaching a cumulative amount of $20 billion. The United States has also become India’s biggest partner in joint military exercises.
Many of these avenues of collaboration are likely to continue and deepen under the Biden administration, especially given the early focus the Biden administration has accorded the Indo-Pacific. However, both sides have also recognized that, with may of these early steps and “low hanging fruit” out of the way, the U.S. and India will now craft an agenda to operationalize the defense partnership in meaningful ways. Minister Singh already suggested this effort was underway when he mentioned in his remarks after the bilateral talks with Secretary Austin that, “acknowledging that we have in place the foundational agreements, LEMOA, COMCASA and BECA, we discussed steps to be taken to realise their full potential for mutual benefit.”
While this visit underscored that there continues to be a strategic imperative to deepen defense cooperation and a will on both sides to chart an ambitious agenda, both countries will also need to grapple with three important and complicated factors that can affect the defense relationship.
The first is in both countries approach to Afghanistan. Although both the United States and India would like to see a peaceful and democratic Afghanistan, differences in approach have continued to limit the ability to both countries to work together. The United States has traditionally kept India at arms length to preserve its relationship with Pakistan, despite the latter’s continued support for the Taliban. Meanwhile, India has remained hesitant of participating in direct negotiations with the Taliban while broadly supporting any Afghan government-led initiatives to create peace. Today, the United States has set a deadline of May 1st to withdraw all troops from the region, and has invited India to take a seat at the table in a U.N.-led peace conference to create a durable peace between the Afghan government and the Taliban. Previous differences in approach will need to be overcome if both the United States and India are to coordinate on creating peace in Afghanistan, especially in the compressed timeline the United States has set before it aims to withdraw troops.
The second continues to be on U.S. concerns about India’s democratic decline. Shortly before Secretary Austin landed in Delhi, Sen. Robert Menendez, the Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, released a letter to Secretary Austin in which he urged him “to raise democracy and human rights concerns in your discussions with the Indian government,” writing “I would like to see the U.S.-India partnership grow, but we must acknowledge that the partnership is strongest when based on shared democratic values and the Indian government has been trending away from those values.” Although some reports citing Indian government sources said there was no discussion of India’s democracy or human rights, Suhasini Haider, National Editor and Diplomatic Affairs Editor at The Hindu noted that Secretary Austin himself confirmed that the had raised the issue in private conversations with members of the Indian Cabinet. While many in India, both within and outside of government, may argue these conversations and critiques about India’s commitment to democracy as baseless, the fact remains that India’s actions and policies - from its approach to Kashmir to the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Act and its links to the National Register to Citizens to the government’s handling of farmer protests - have raised questions about the government’s commitment to upholding democratic values. While these concerns will not erase the strategic logic undergirding deepening security ties between the United States and India, they can potentially chip away slowly at the enthusiasm on part of the Biden administration (which has made democracy a key pillar in its foreign engagements) or on members of Congress to support closer ties with India.
Finally, and perhaps most seriously, is the issue of potential sanctions on India’s purchase of the S-400. Under the U.S.’s Counter America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), India’s planned acquisition of the S-400 missile defense system from Russia can trigger U.S. sanctions. Although a waiver authority was created in the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, the waiver is not country-specific, and must match certain conditions (such as the waiver being in U.S. national security interest and the country in question taking steps to limit future acquisitions of Russian equipment) in order to applied. When asked about whether India might receive a waiver, Secretary Austin did not give a definitive answer, saying:
“We have countries that we work with from time to time that have Soviet or excuse me Russian equipment that they acquired over the years are we certainly urge all our allies and partners to move away from Soviet or excuse me Russian equipment. In some cases it was Soviet equipment because they bought it so long ago.
But to move away from that and really avoid any kind of acquisitions that would trigger sanctions on our behalf. There has -- there has been no delivery of an S-400 system. And so that conversation -- the issues of sanctions is not one that's been discussed. But we did address with the Minister of Defense the issue of the S-400.”
Although the waiver authority has been created, the threat of sanctions continues to remain given souring relations between the United States and Russia. The application of such sanctions, even if nominal or symbolic, could threaten future bilateral cooperation between both countries. Navigating a way around those sanctions will likely remain a top priority for both countries as India inches towards the delivery of the S-400 system later this year.
Further Reading:
Vikram J. Singh and Joe Felter, both of whom have served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for South and Southeast Asia: How SecDef Austin Can Make the Most of His India Visit
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Distinguished Fellow and Head of the Nuclear and Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation: US Defense Secretary Austin’s Visit to India: A Sign of Closer India-US Security Ties
Jeff Smith, Research Fellow, South Asia at the Heritage Foundation: Austin Goes to India: An Agenda for India–U.S. Defense Consultations
Lara Seligman, Defense Reporter at Politico: Austin meets with India’s Modi as U.S.-China summit gets off to rocky start
Dr. Rudra Chaudhuri, Director of Carnegie India: The centrality of defence in India-US ties
Dr. Sumit Ganguly, distinguished professor of political science and the Rabindranath Tagore Chair in Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington: For the US, the competing priorities on India
[VIDEO] Lisa Curtis, Director of the Indo-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), in conversation with Ambassador Kenneth Juster, former U.S. Ambassador to India (2017-2021), Ambassador Richard Verma, former U.S. Ambassador to India (2014-2017), and Richard Fontaine, Chief Executive Officer of CNAS: Maintaining the Momentum: U.S.-India Relations under the Biden Administration
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Reflections on the Resignation of Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta
On March 16, The Indian Express reported that Dr. Pratap Bhanu Mehta, one of India’s finest academics, had resigned from his role as Professor at Ashoka University. Initial speculation that his resignation came not for personal reasons, but due to political pressure, was soon confirmed when the text of his resignation letter was released. In it, he writes:
It has become abundantly clear to me that my association with the University may be considered a political liability. My public writing in support of a politics that tries to honour constitutional values of freedom and equal respect for all citizens, is perceived to carry risks for the university.
As the news of Dr. Mehta’s resignation, and the circumstances surrounding it, was publicly revealed, I joined many to express their dismay at what had transpired.
I have never met Dr. Mehta. I have only ever engaged with his writings, his ideas, and his arguments. His writings on political theory, democracy, and India’s constitution have expanded my horizons, even when (and arguably, especially when) I have disagreed with Dr. Mehta’s arguments or hypotheses. In my own academic research, I critically engaged with his publications on international relations and India’s foreign policy, arguing against a hypothesis he advanced that India does not have a grand strategy.
I have always looked to Dr. Mehta’s writings as ideas that deeply thought-provoking. Whenever I have agreed with them, I have sought to emulate their example of how to undertake serious and rigorous scholarship, and how to translate it for a public audience. Whenever I have disagreed with them, they have served as one of the most effective whetstones against which I could sharpen my own arguments.
It’s gutting to see that political compulsions and pressures forced him to resign. It speaks volumes about the limits of academic freedom and freedom of expression, or lack thereof, at Ashoka and, arguably in India at large, if academics are compelled to leave due to political pressures. However, what transpired at Ashoka doesn’t take away from the fact that Dr. Mehta remains one of India’s finest thinkers and public intellectuals. His ability to provoke thought is clear in the final pieces of writings he wrote as a faculty member of Ashoka: his resignation and his letter to the students of Ashoka.
I continue to wish more power to his voice and pen.
Is India Facing a Second Wave of COVID-19 Infections?
On Sunday, March 21, India recorded 43,846 cases of COVID-19 in 24 hours. This was the highest one-day tally of COVID-19 cases in India since November 26, 2020.
For comparison, India was down to a low of ~9,000 cases per day in early February.
83% of the 43,846 cases came from six states: Maharashtra, Punjab, Kerala, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh.
Maharashtra led the pack far and away, recording 27,126 cases over 24 hours.
Dr. Randeep Guleria, Director of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, blamed three factors for the spike in cases:
“There is a loss of Covid-appropriate behaviour. Now people feel that the pandemic is over because vaccines are here. So they fail to wear masks. We see large crowds gathering - again without masks. Many of these crowded events have become super-spreading events.”
“The other issue is that we are become lax in the basic principle of testing, tracking, and isolating than what were doing six months ago.”
“The third point is that the virus itself is mutating and some of the variants are more infectious.”
Prime Minister Modi held a virtual meeting with the Chief Ministers of various states and Union Territories last week on March 17, where he noted the need to “immediately stop this emerging "second peak" of the corona” and for “quick and decisive steps.” His complete remarks (translated to English) are available here.
A Brief Self-Promotional Interlude
Last week, South Asian Voices, an outlet for policy analysis and commentary hosted by the South Asia program at the Stimson Center, published my article on the India-China border stand-offs and the disengagement at Pangong Tso. In it, I argue:
For at least nine months, Indian and Chinese troops have faced off at multiple points along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) — the disputed and undemarcated border between the two countries. However, on February 11, 2021, India’s Defense Minister Rajnath Singh announced that both countries had reached an agreement to disengage at one of those points — Pangong Tso. The agreement to disengage is certainly welcome news. However, the crisis at the border is far from over. If the situation in eastern Ladakh is to return to status quo ante with both sides completely de-escalating, India and China will need to traverse a crossroads that could shape the future of their bilateral ties at a time when there is little to no trust on both sides.
You can read the full piece here. And as always, please do email me any feedback or suggestions you have.
News Roundup
The Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) has confirmed the dates of Prime Minister Modi’s upcoming trip to Bangladesh, which will officially take place from March 26-27, 2021. Per the PMO, “this visit is in connection with the commemoration of three epochal events - Mujib Borsho, the birth centenary of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman; 50 years of the establishment of diplomatic ties between India and Bangladesh; and 50 years of Bangladesh’s war of liberation.” The visit will be Prime Minister Modi’s first foreign visit since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Prime Minister Modi held a virtual summit with his counterpart from Finland, Prime Minister Sanna Marin, on March 16. The two leaders discussed ways to expand the bilateral relationship across sectors such as trade and investment, innovation, education, emerging technologies (including Artificial Intelligence, 5G/6G, and quantum computing), renewable and bio-energy, sustainability, edu-tech, pharmaceuticals, and digitization. Prime Minister Modi also invited Finland to join the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure.
The Cabinet approved the creation of a development financial institution (DFI) to boost investments in India’s infrastructure projects, such as roads, ports, and energy. The DFI was first announced in Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s 2021-22 Budget speech, where she allocated $2.8 billion for the institution.
Reports indicate that Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Boris Johnson will make his trip to India at the end of April. The visit, his first international trip after Brexit, comes after the completion of an “Integrated Review” of the UK government’s policy, which recommended that it "tilt” the UK’s focus towards the Indo-Pacific region. Prime Minister Johnson was earlier slated to visit India in January 2021 for as the Chief Guest for India’s Republic Day Celebrations. However, that trip was cancelled due to a sharp increase in COVID-19 infection in the Uk at the time.
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen announced she had spoken on the phone with India’s Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman on March 15, 2021. Secretary Yellen “emphasized India’s role as a critical partner in Asia and conveyed her intention to collaborate closely to support a strong global recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, fight inequality, and advance a bold climate agenda.”
News outlets such as BloombergQuint and Reuters reviewed the latest draft of India’s new e-commerce policy, the third such iteration of the policy. The policy continues to emphasize the need for e-commerce firms to “treat sellers equally on their platforms and ensure transparency” while removing mentions to “an e-commerce regulator,” which were included in the previous draft of the policy.
The United States and India have launched a “U.S. India Artificial Intelligence Initiative” under the umbrella of the Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum. The initiative aims to “serve as a platform to discuss opportunities, challenges, and barriers for bilateral AI R&D collaboration, enable AI innovation, help share ideas for developing an AI workforce, and recommend modes and mechanisms for catalyzing partnerships.”
India and Pakistan are slated to engage in two significant diplomatic interactions in the coming week. On March 23-24, the Indus Water Commissioners of Pakistan and India will meet after a two-year hiatus. Following that, news reports indicate that India’s External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar will meet with his counterpart from Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, on the sidelines of the Heart of Asia conference, slated to be held on March 30.
India’s Ministry of External Affairs has a new spokesperson, Arindam Bagchi, who comes to the role of Joint Secretary (External Publicity) from serving as Joint Secretary (North). Now former spokesperson Anurag Srivastava will take over as Joint Secretary (North).
India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade within the Ministry of Commerce and Industry undertook the 4th Review meeting Memorandum of Cooperation on Industrial Property with Japanese officials from the Japan Patent Office in Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan.
The Acquisition Wing of the Ministry of Defense signed a contract with Bharat Dynamics Limited for the supply of 4,960 MILAN-2T Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) to Indian Army at a cost of Rs 1,188 crore (~$164 million).
India’s Ministry of Road Transport & Highways has released the draft rules for the establishment of facilities for the scrapping of registered vehicles. The complete draft rules are available here, and open to comment from the public until April 18, 2021.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening:
Dr. Milan Vaishnav, Senior Fellow and Director of the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes: “India’s drop in the democracy league tables has less to do with the nature of its elections—which are largely free and fair—than with the shrinking democratic space between them. These grim assessments point to several troubling political developments in the country: the consolidation of a Hindu-majoritarian brand of politics, the excessive concentration of power in the hands of the executive, and the clampdown on political dissent and on the media.”
Vibhav Mariwala and Kadambari Shah, Senior Analyst and Senior Associate, respectively, at IDFC Institute, argue: “More than 70 years after Independence, most of India’s institutions continue to act predominantly as forces of control rather than governance and administration. While centralising elements are necessary at times, the problem largely lies in the fact that these institutions, which stemmed from colonial structures, have not evolved along with the country’s growth, thereby obstructing State capacity. This was perhaps understandable in the initial post-colonial decades given the magnitude of the nation-building project and existential threats. That time, however, is long gone.”
Darshana Baruah, an associate fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she leads the Indian Ocean Initiative, writes: “The world’s most important strategic chokepoints lie in the Indian Ocean, making the region a key theater in geopolitical competition. Then why is it still missing from Washington’s Indo-Pacific priorities? U.S. Pacific Command was recently re-named United States Indo-Pacific Command in order to highlight the importance of the Indian Ocean region. Yet, the Indian Ocean, in its entirety, remains largely absent from the command’s priorities and engagements. A name change alone can’t alter the fact that the Indian and the Pacific Oceans require different approaches, and that Indo-Pacific Command remains focused primarily on China and the Pacific.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.