One Year After Galwan
June 15 marks one year after the unfortunate and violent clashes at Patrol Point 14 in the Galwan Valley
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One Year After Galwan
Tomorrow, June 15, will mark one year since the unfortunate and deadly clashes between Indian and Chinese troops near Patrol Point 14 (PP-14) in the Galwan Valley in Eastern Ladakh - the first casualties along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China since 1975. The clashes led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers from the 16th Bihar Regiment and at least four Chinese soldiers.
The clashes in Galwan came against a backdrop of a multi-point standoff in Eastern Ladakh, with Chinese troops attempting/making incursions at several points along the LAC.
The earliest publicly reported date of the start of the stand-offs is on May 5, when news sources reported Indian and Chinese troops were facing off at Pangong Tso. Soon, reports emerged of additional stand-offs at Gogra-Hot Springs, Demchok, the Galwan Valley, and Depsang.
To resolve these standoffs, Indian and Chinese military leaders engaged in bilateral talks at the Army Corps Commanders-level. The first such meeting was held on June 6, which resulted in an agreement for both sides to disengage “in a phased manner” in several areas, including the Galwan Valley, Patrolling Point 15, and the Hot Springs.
However, it was during this attempted disengagement that the clashes in Galwan took place. Per India’s Ministry of External Affairs, the Indian troops were attacked in a “pre-meditated and planned action” when troops from the 16th Bihar Regiment, led by Colonel Santosh Babu, were verifying that the Chinese has disengaged at Patrolling Point 14 in the Galwan Valley. China, in its version of events, suggested that it was Indian troops who crossed the LAC, leading to the clash.
Since the violent clash in Galwan, India and China have held ten more rounds of talks at the Army Corps Commander level (the last of which was held on April 9, 2021), as well as seven rounds of diplomatic talks under the aegis of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (the last of which was held on March 12, 2021). India’s Defense and External Affairs Ministers also met with their Chinese counterparts in Moscow on September 4 and September 10 respectively.
Beyond talks, India also undertook a counter-offensive military operation on August 29-30 to secure the heights on the Kailash Range, including Rezang La and Rechin La, on the southern bank of Pangong Tso. Per reports, India and China have amassed nearly 50,000 troops each, as well as heavy equipment such as tanks and artillery, to the area.
However, no breakthrough was announced until February, when the Chinese Ministry of Defense announced a simultaneous disengagement of Indian and Chinese troops at Pangong Tso, which was confirmed in the February 11 speech by Indian Defense Minister Singh. Independent sources have since verified that Indian and Chinese troops have disengaged at Pangong Tso, and that, as per the agreement, Indian troops are stationed at Finger 3, while Chinese troops will be stationed east of Finger 8, with a similar pullback in the south bank.
Since the February disengagement in Pangong Two, however, there has been little movement towards disengagement in the other hotspots where Indian and Chinese troops continue to face-off, particularly Gogra-Hot Springs, Demchok, and Depsang. While two rounds of Army Corps Commander-level talks have been held, there is very little to suggest that both countries are any closer to disengaging in these areas. Moreover, reporting now suggests that, due to the emergence of a second wave of COVID-19 infections in India, “there is unlikely to be any Corps Commander level talks between India and China over the next couple of months.”
Given that we are now marking one year since the clash in the Galwan Valley, it’s important to unpack three important issues.
First, what does the path to disengagement look like in Eastern Ladakh? Talks between both countries have slowed down, while soldiers from both sides continue to maintain a vigilant watch over the other side’s activities. However, while India has remained consistent in demanding that both sides return to the status quo ante as on April 2020, there are some suggestions that India is in it for the long haul to achieve this goal. In a recent interview with the Rajat Pandit of The Times of India, India’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Manoj Naravane stated:
We, of course, cannot be complacent. We have to keep a strict watch. We are doing it. Negotiations are being conducted for resolution of other friction points in a firm but non-escalatory manner… We should not expect a result from every round. The disengagement at Pangong Tso happened after 10 rounds. The next round will take place… The Sumdorong Chu face-off (in the 1980s) lasted for some years. It’s difficult to give a timeframe. Issues remain to be resolved at the friction points. Negotiations do take time. We will resolve them by-and-by.
Keeping a strict watch while keeping negotiations going, even if face-offs last for some years, will mean keeping troops deployed through the harsh winters of Ladakh. India, given its deployments in the Siachin glacier, certainly has the logistical and infrastructure capacity to maintain such deployments. However, what remains unclear is whether the maintenance of the current posture while negotiations continue can result in disengagement, or if China, having made its incursions, will either look to drag out negotiations while it solidifies its own presence in new areas, thereby changing the status quo.
If the latter is true, then it leads to a second question: does India need to impose costs, political or otherwise, in order to push China towards agreeing to disengage and restore the status quo ante as on April 2020? If so, what do such costs look like?
Military and strategic analysts have noted that India did have some significant leverage to force a disengagement solution when it undertook a tit-for-tat operation when it secured the heights on the South Bank of the Pangong Two, and that it may have given up an important piece of its leverage by vacating those heights for only a limited disengagement in the Pangong Tso area. However, such speculation comes with very little insight into the actual dynamic of the negotiations between India and China. Regardless, with both sides now vigilantly monitoring the border areas, it may not be operationally possible for India to undertake similar actions to force a disengagement on other areas of the border.
Are there non-military costs that India can impose on China? Certainly, India did ban Chinese apps in the aftermath of the clashes in Galwan, and took steps to limit government procurement from any China-based entities. However, given that India-China trade grew year-on-year from January -May from 2020 to 2021, it remains clear that those moves were largely symbolic. Can other steps - such as Dr. Ashley Tellis’ suggestion that India bar domestic entities from using Chinese cloud services - impose enough costs on China to create leverage towards an agreement to disengage and return to status quo ante?
Finally, zooming out beyond the crisis in Eastern Ladakh to the broader relationship, what will the future of India-China relationship look like following the events of the last year or so? Certainly, it is clear that India-China relations will not return to business as usual, and that relations will become more competitive. However, what remains unknown is what the new normal will look like, and how both countries will manage competition in this new normal.
On the border, do both sides need to negotiate new confidence building measures to ensure incidents like those at PP-14 in Galwan do not happen again? Can India and China actually settle and demarcate the border? Beyond the border, what will a more competitive relationship in other areas - from economics and trade to the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan post-U.S. withdrawal - look like? What can India do to compete more effectively with China in these domains?
As we approach the one-year mark of the violent and unfortunate clashes in the Galwan Valley, these questions become all the more relevant as we think about what the future holds for the ongoing crisis on the border, as well as the wider India-China relationship.
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News Roundup
Prime Minister Modi participated virtually in last week’s G7 summit, which took place June 12 and 13, 2021. India was invited as a “Special Invitee” by Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Boris Johnson, who is hosting the G7 summit this year. As part of PM Modi’s participation in the summit, he participated in a total of three sessions:
On June 12, he participated in the “Outreach Session” titled “‘Building Back Stronger: Health”
On June 13, he participated in two sessions titled “Building Back Together: Open Societies and Economies” and “Building Back Greener: Climate and Nature’”
Reports emerged last week that Prime Minister Modi may travel to the United States later this year, possibly between September and November, for an in-person meeting with President Biden. The reports came after Kurt Campell, a senior official in the Biden administration and the Indo-Pacific Coordinator at the U.S. National Security Council, said at an event that “Our goal is to hold an in person Quad meeting…very ambitious meeting here in Washington in the fall with all leaders in attendance.”
Dinakar Peri of The Hindu reported that, since the Indian and Pakistani government’s February 2021 commitment to adhere to the conditions of a ceasefire agreed to by both countries in 2003, there has been no exchange of fire nor infiltration attempts from across the Line of Control (LoC) for over 100 days and no infiltration attempts.
Judge Anand Venkatesh of the Madras High Court, in his ruling on a case brought before the court by a lesbian couple who said they had been harassed by police, ordered state and federal officials to craft a plan to undertake major reforms in order to better respect LGBT rights in the country. The ruling was described by experts as the “first major order that addresses most challenges concerning the whole LGBTQIA+ community and issues specific directions.”
Rezaul H Laskar, head of the Foreign Affairs desk at Hindustan Times, reported that “India has for the first time opened channels of communication with Afghan Taliban factions and leaders, including Mullah Baradar, against the backdrop of the rapid drawdown of US forces from Afghanistan.”
The e-Committee of the Supreme Court of India has released the Draft Model Rules for how court proceedings in India can be live-streamed and recorded in order to “imbue greater transparency, inclusivity and foster access to justice.” The complete Draft Model Rules are available here, and are open to comments from the public until June 30, 2021.
External Affairs Minister Jaishankar visited Kuwait from June 9-11, 2021 and is in the midst of the visit to Kenya, from June 12-14, 2021.
Vijaita Singh and Jagriti Chandra of The Hindu reported that “Emails and passwords of hundreds of Union government officials have been exposed to hackers due to the recent data breaches of Air India, Domino’s and Big Basket.”
They reported that “several government offices, including Defence Ministry officials, were targeted by a malicious web link sent on WhatsApp and SMS, asking them to update their vaccination status. The message asked officials to click on [a website] to generate a digital certificate of COVID-19 inoculation, redirecting them to a page “@gov.in” that resembles the government website mygov.in, and asked for the official e-mail and password.
However, the government, through the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, issued a press release denying the breach, stating “there has been no cyber breach into the email system of the Government of India maintained by the National Informatics Centre (NIC). The email system is totally safe and secure.”
The Ministry of Coal, in partnership with Industry Partner FICCI (The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry) held the first Stakeholders’ Consultation for the Second Tranche of Auction of Coal Mines for Commercial Mining. The meeting was the first in a series of two stakeholder consultations, and saw participation of leading players from coal and mining business, equipment manufacturers, mine developers and operators (MDOs) and financial institutions.The Second Tranche of Coal Mines includes 67 mines and is described as the “biggest ever offer of coal mines in the country.”
The Governments of India and Australia held the first ever meeting of the “India - Australia Joint Working Group (JWG) on Cyber Security Cooperation.” The JWG brings together policy makers and working level experts in the area to strengthen bilateral cooperation, specifically in the areas of digital economy, cyber security and critical and emerging technologies. The JWG runs in parallel to a similar JWG, which is yet to be launched, on Information and Communication Technologies.
Defense Minister Rajnath Singh approved a new policy for the archiving, declassification, compilation, and publication of war/operations histories by the Ministry of Defence. Under the new policy, “each organisation under the Ministry of Defence such as Services, Integrated Defence Staff, Assam Rifles and Indian Coast Guard, will transfer the records, including war diaries, letters of proceedings & operational record books, etc., to the History Division of Ministry of Defence (MoD) for proper upkeep, archival and writing the histories.”
The Indian Navy and the Royal Thai Navy conducted a “Coordinated Patrol” (CORPAT) along their International Maritime Boundary Line on June 9-11, 2021. This CORPAT, held bi-annually since 2005, is aimed at building understanding and interoperability between navies, as well as facilitating institution of measures to prevent and suppress unlawful activities like Illegal Unreported Unregulated fishing, drug trafficking, maritime terrorism, armed robbery and piracy.
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Five to Read - Foreign/Security Policy
Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Director of the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore: For India, G-7 is an opportunity to expand ties with West - The Indian Express
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy & Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation: India’s Submarine Saga - The Diplomat
Chirayu Thakkar, a doctoral candidate in International Relations at the National University of Singapore: Indian Fusion Center-Indian Ocean Region: Security and Stature - South Asian Voices
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Professor of International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University: A rather thin Foreign Policy debate - The Observer Research Foundation
[PODCAST] Darshana Baruah, Associate Fellow at the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in conversation with Dr. Mike Green, Senior Vice President for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: The Indian Ocean and the Asia Chessboard - The Asia Chessboard Podcast at CSIS
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