Bloodshed at the Border
At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in action in the first casualties on the Line of Actual Control in nearly 45 years
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Tensions High Between India and China After Border Clashes Lead to Casualties
On the night of June 15, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in deadly clashes in the Galwan Valley which led to the death of 20 Indian soldiers and an unknown number of casualties on the Chinese side.
The incident marked the first time troops were killed in action along the India-China border since 1975, when a patrol of Indian soldiers from the Assam Rifles was ambushed by the Chinese troops in Arunachal Pradesh. The incident raises three important questions that today’s edition of the newsletter will address: What, to the best of our knowledge, transpired on the night of June 15? How are both countries reacting in the aftermath of the clashes? And what options does India have now?
1. What, to the best of our knowledge, transpired on the night of June 15?
Let me begin by saying it is next to impossible to state definitively what happened in the lead-up to the clash. But some facts have emerged. The story begins on June 6, when Indian and Chinese military leaders reached an agreement on a framework on how troops from both countries could disengage. By June 9, Indian army officers had said there was a “limited military disengagement” at three points along the Line of Actual Control: the Galwan Valley, Patrolling Point 15, and Hot Springs.
This “limited military disengagement” was confirmed on June 13 by India’s Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Manoj Naravane, who said “Both sides are disengaging in a phased manner. We have started from the north, from the area of the Galwan river where a lot of disengagement has taken place.”
However, the Indian Army stated that it was “during the de-escalation process underway in the Galwan Valley” that “a violent face-off took place… with casualties on both sides.” The initial statement said that one officer and two soldiers had lost the lives. However, a later statement said that total number of troops killed in action was 20.
Sushant Singh of The Indian Express has some details on what may have transpired:
As part of [the de-escalation] process, a buffer zone had been agreed to be created between the LAC and the junction of the Shyok and Galwan rivers to avoid any faceoff between the two armies. The two armies were to move back by a kilometre each in that area as a first step.
When Colonel B Santosh Babu, who was monitoring this process, noticed that a Chinese camp was still existing in the area, he went to get it removed. This soon led to fisticuffs and blows being exchanged, resulting in deaths and injuries.
Shiv Aroor, a Senior Editor at India Today has some further details in a source-based account of the events that transpired on the night of June 15, including how the clashes were spread over three separate brawls, involved weapons such as metal-spiked clubs and barbed-wire wrapped rods, as well as the presence of “new” Chinese troops who do not normally patrol on the Chinese side of the LAC in the region.
Obviously, statements by the Chinese government have denied that Chinese troops or activities were responsible for the incident, stating instead that “Indian forces crossed the Line of Actual Control” and “made deliberate provocations and even violently attacked the Chinese soldiers who went for negotiations.”
One note on weapons: newcomers to India-China border dynamics may ask why weapons such as “metal-spiked clubs and barbed-wire wrapped rods” were used. That’s because the 1996 “Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas” prevents either side from opening fire within two kilometers of the LAC. So while the Indian Minister for External Affairs has confirmed that the Indian soldiers were carrying their weapons, they did not use them.
However, this revelation has not been without controversy, with many retired Indian Army officials stating that the agreement does not bar the use of weapons if the other side kills the Commanding Officer, as was the case on June 15.
2. How are both countries reacting in the aftermath of the clashes?
Since the clashes, the situation is tense along the Line of Actual Control, as well as in the broader India-China relationship.
Following the clashes in the Galwan Valley, military leaders at the level of Major Generals from both armies met at Patrol Point 14 on June 16, which concluded with the Indian side being able to collect the bodies of fallen troops, as well as allowing the Chinese to send helicopters to bring their injured back. The Indian government placed all armed forces units on operational alert (the highest state of readiness), and further rounds of military talks were held until Thursday, June 18. Ten Indian Army personnel captured by the Chinese were also returned on the evening of June 18.
Statements by the foreign ministries of both countries also blamed the other for crossing the LAC into their territory, and breaking the June 6 agreement.
India’s readout of the phone call between India’s Minister of External Affairs Dr. S Jaishankar and State Councillor and Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi emphasized that:
The Chinese side sought to erect a structure in Galwan valley on our side of the LAC. While this became a source of dispute, the Chinese side took pre-meditated and planned action that was directly responsible for the resulting violence and casualties. It reflected an intent to change the facts on ground in violation of all our agreements to not change the status quo.
EAM underlined that this unprecedented development will have a serious impact on the bilateral relationship. The need of the hour was for the Chinese side to reassess its actions and take corrective steps.
The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs readout basically recounted the same events, but painting India as the aggressor:
When the situation in the Galwan Valley had deescalated, the Indian forces crossed the Line of Actual Control again, made deliberate provocations and even violently attacked the Chinese soldiers who went for negotiations. This subsequently led to fierce physical clashes and resulted in casualties. The adventurism of the Indian army seriously violated agreements on border issues between the two countries and severely violated basic norms governing international relations. China once again lodges its strong protest to the Indian side. We urge the Indian side to conduct a thorough investigation, hold the violators accountable, strictly discipline the frontline troops and immediately stop all provocative acts to ensure such incidents will not occur again.
While both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to engage in dialogue and maintain “peace and tranquility” on the border, this trade in allegations of the other crossing the LAC has added tension to the bilateral relationship.
Further adding tension is claims over the Galwan Valley. The Western Command of the People’s Liberation Army has made a statement in the aftermath of the clashes saying: “The sovereignty of the Galwan River Valley has always been ours.” India’s Ministry of External Affairs has responded forcefully, saying the claims are “exaggerated and untenable.” However, as former Indian army officials have noted, the Galwan Valley has not been a source of tensions between India and China for tensions, suggesting that this new claim could add additional strain to the bilateral relationship in the aftermath of the clashes.
3. What options does India have now?
The question on a lot of strategists mind is what can India do now? Is there a path to achieve de-escalation while ensuring that India does not cede territory to China?
The answer to that question depends on whether Chinese troops are currently occupying Indian territory - an issue which had been throughly confused after a speech by the Prime Minister last week.
In an “All Party Meeting” to brief the leaders of all of India’s political parties represented in Parliament, Prime Minister said in Hindi (transliterated, and then translated) that:
Na wahan koi hamaari seema main ghus aaya hai, naa hi koi ghusa hua hai, naa hi hamaari koi post kisi doosre ke kabze main ha. Ladakh main, humaare 20 jawaan shaheed hue, lekin jinhone Bharata Mata ki taraf aankh utha kar dekha ta, unhe wo sabak sikha kar gaye hai”
Neither has anyone intruded upon our borders, not is anyone currently intruding, nor is any Indian post in the hands of anyone else. In Ladakh, 20 of our soldiers have died but those who have raised their eyes at Bharat Mata, they have been taught a lesson
You can listen to the Prime Minister himself here:
Here’s the issue: if the Prime Minister is saying that no has intruded our borders, then it calls into question the Indian government’s official story until now that China crossed the LAC and attempted to set up camps, and which is what led to the death of Indian soldiers. It also has some serious implications for India’s claims in Lake Pangong, where India has claimed that its territorial claims extend until Finger 8, but where the Chinese have erected camps and are refusing Indian patrols beyond Finger 4.
However, if Modi’s use of the verb “ghus aaya hai” or “has intruded” is specifically about the narrow present (the day he made his speech), then it is more than just a semantic slip-up. It gave ammunition to the Chinese to reinforce their claims in Ladakh, as Chinese media circulated his statement on social media:
While the Prime Minister’s Office did later clarify the statement to say that “As regards transgression of LAC, it was clearly stated that the violence in Galwan on 15 June arose because Chinese side was seeking to erect structures just across the LAC and refused to desist from such actions.” However, many analysts have already wondered whether the statement laid the foundation for China to claim a fait accompli to maintain their new claims after this latest stand-off began:
However, if the statement was indeed a result of sloppy speech-writing and nothing more, it leaves India with few good options now. The ideal would be to find a way to return to enacting the June 6 agreement reached by military leaders from both countries. However, that’s easier said that done, especially after the blood spilled on the border. Other options include using force, either to eject the Chinese in areas claimed by India, or open a new front with the Chinese to create a leverage. However, these actions come with high risks of this escalating in a wider conflict.
For now, we’ll have to wait and watch. But there is no denying that we are in an incredibly tense moment in India-China relations.
Brief Self-Promotional Interlude:
I was invited to briefly discuss the border clash, and what might happen next, on Al Jazeera English. If you are interested, you can watch my segment (beginning on 6:15) here:
Further reading:
Dr. C Raja Mohan, Director, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore:Growing power differential is what lies behind China’s assertion in Ladakh
Dr. Tanvi Madan, , Senior Fellow and director of The India Project at the Brookings Institution: China policy needs rethink but India can’t take forever to do it
Yun Sun, Director of the China Program at the Stimson Center: China’s Strategic Assessment of the Ladakh Clash
Michele Flournoy, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and co-founder of WestExec Advisors: Treat China’s border clash with India as a clarion call
Dr. Rajesh Rajagopalan, professor in International Politics at Jawaharlal Nehru University: “India can’t free-ride others to limit China. It needs to lead the containment strategy”
Satellite Imagery Analysis:
Nathan Ruser for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute: “Satellite images show positions surrounding deadly China–India clash”
Simon Scarr and Sanjeev Miglani for Reuters: “Satellite images suggest Chinese activity at India's Himalayan border before clash”
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No More Manels, Please
Khushi Padma Singh and Dr. Rohan Mukherjee announced a fantastic new resource this week: a GoogleDoc with names, titles, and contact information of 328 women who are experts in Indian foreign policy across government, media, academia, and think tanks. If you are hosting an event, participating in a panel, or inviting speakers for talks and interviews, please consult this resource. There is no excuse to hold, or be a willing participant, in manels in 2020.
In Other News
Elections held this week for the Rajya Sabha (or Upper House) of Parliament resulted in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) increasing its share of the seats to 86 out of a total of 245, with the opposition Indian National Congress reduced down to 41 seats. The National Democratic Alliance, led by the BJP, now totals nearly 100 members, and with support from friendly parties not in the alliance, the NDA has a working majority.
The Ministry of External Affairs confirmed that foreign minister Dr. S Jaishankar will participate in the trilateral Russia-India-China (RIC) foreign ministers meeting, which will take place virtually, on June 23. This announcement as speculation rose about whether India would skip the meeting following the violent clash between Indian and Chinese troops along the border.
Police officials in the Rampur police station in Varanasi have charged Supriya Sharma, the executive editor of Scroll.in under Sections 501 and 269 of the Indian Penal Code, which allege she printed “defamatory matter”, and undertook a “negligent act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life” Sharma’s article reported on how residents in a village within Varanasi, which was “adopted” by Prime Minister Modi’s as part of his work representing Varanasi as his parliamentary district, went hungry during the nation-wide lockdown due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Editorial Guild of India expressed deep concern over the registration of charges against Sharma.
India joined Australia, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, New Zealand, Singapore, Slovenia, the United Kingdom and the United States to establish the Global Partnership on Artificial Intelligence, which is aimed at “ensuring that Artificial Intelligence is used responsibly, respecting human rights and democratic values.” The secretariat of the coalition will be hosted by the OECD.
Prime Minister Modi, in an interaction with the chief ministers of the states of India, said that India would soon move into Phase 2 of India’s “unlock” process to reopen the economy following the nation-wide lockdown resulting from the spread of COVID-2019. He also stressed “the need to fight rumours of lockdown,” suggesting that India would not be returning to a lockdown despite the rise in cases of COVID-19 in recent weeks.
Three to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening.
Maria Abi-Habib, South Asia correspondent for The New York Times, analyzes whether India will side with the West against China: “Prime Minister Narendra Modi has publicly reveled in the prospect of a more muscular role for India in the region and the world. But analysts say the new tensions with China will be the starkest test yet of whether India is ready — or truly willing — to jostle with a rising power bent on expanding its interests and territory. With China facing new scrutiny and criticism over the coronavirus pandemic, Indian officials have recently seemed emboldened, taking steps that made Western diplomats feel that their goal of an India closer to the West was starting to be realized. And some believe the friction with China will push India even further in that direction.”
Dr. Joshua T. White, Non-Resident Fellow at the Brookings Institution and associate professor of the practice of South Asia studies at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, writes: “Although China’s ultimate aims in the Indian Ocean remain somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that the Chinese leadership is actively pursuing capabilities that would allow it to undertake a range of military missions in the region. This paper explores five such mission objectives — ranging from relatively “benign” activities to those that would be more alarming to U.S. and Indian policy planners — and describes the kinds of defense and economic investments that China would require to carry them out.”
Amb. Vijay Gokhale, former Foreign Secretary of India, argues that the South China Sea is critical for Indian security: “How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for our security and well-being. In the first place, the South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common. Second, it has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and passage has been unimpeded over the centuries. Third, Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to Quanzhou in China. Fourth, nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Fifth, we have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly countries, are essential for our economic well-being. In short, the South China Sea is our business.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.