A Slow Process of Disengagement
India and China begin to move troops back at certain points of tension along the LAC
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India and China Begin A Slow Process of Disengagement at the Line of Actual Control
It seems that after engaging in multiple stand-offs in several different points along the Line of Actual Control, India and China are engaged in a slow, deliberate process of disengagement. Let’s take a look at the play-by-play of events as they happened last week.
On July 5, Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval and Wang Yi, State Councillor and Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, who serve as Special Representatives of India and China on the Boundary Question, spoke on the telephone and had a “frank and in-depth exchange of views on the recent developments in the Western Sector of the India-China border areas.”
By July 6, reports emerged that a disengagement between India and China had started to take place at two key areas where India and China have been engaged in a stand-off - the Galwan River Valley and Pangong Lake. This marked the first signs of a reduction in tensions between India and China since a previous agreement at disengagement, which was reached on June 6, was disrupted following a violent clash between Indian and Chinese troops on the night of June 15.
In the Galwan River Valley, both Indian and Chinese troops moved back 1.8 km from Patrol Point 14 - the point of the June 15 clashes. At this new position, both sides have agreed to keep only 30 soldiers in make-shift positions. A second perimeter, a further 1km behind the first position, both India and China have agreed to keep 50 soldiers in tents. Both sides can maintain greater numbers of troops a few kilometers behind this second perimeter. However, despite this disengagement, China continues to assert its claim over “the entire Galwan River Valley,” with Indian government sources telling Vijaita Singh and Dinkar Peri of The Hindu that the Indian Army could lose the right to patrol until PP-14 if a final solution is not reached.
The satellite image below (left is from June 28 and right is from July 6) shows that Chinese tents and other make-shift construction near PP-14, a few hundred meters east of where the Galwan river bends before meeting the Shyok river, have been dismantled and removed from the area:
By July 8, reports also emerged of a similar disengagement in the Hot Springs area of Ladakh, where Indian and Chinese troops were engaged in a stand-off at PP-15. Here too, the same formula - 30 troops 1.8 km behind the patrolling point, followed by another 50 troops a further 1km behind the first perimeter - was reportedly used. Senior Army sources also told The Indian Express that “some depletion in the strength of soldiers was observed Wednesday at the third major standoff site at PP17A in Gogra, but both sides continued to be in an eyeball-to-eyeball situation there.”
However, those reports have been contested. Ajai Shukla, a retired Colonel in the Indian Army and defense commentator for Business Standard, has cited reports that say that “The Chinese are flatly refusing to withdraw from their positions, arguing that they are on their own side of the LAC and it is up to the Indian side to withdraw.” He went on to say that, at PP-15, an estimated 1,000 Chinese soldiers remain in Indian territory, while at PP-17A, 1,500 soldiers from both sides are in confrontation.
The area where disengagement has been the slowest is at Pangong Lake. Reports also emerged around July 9 that Chinese troops moved back just barely from Finger 4 to Finger 5 in this area, while Indian troops have moved back from Finger 4 to Finger 3. However, concerns remain for Indian strategists. China’s disengagement from Finger 4 so far has been limited to only its troops along the banks of the river. China continues to maintain its positions on the ridges of Finger 4. Secondly, India’s conceptions of the Line of Actual Control remain that its runs through Finger 8. That means that India is pulling back from territory that it claims to be its own, which China continues to occupy the space - Indian territory - between Fingers 5 and 8, if not 4 and 8 (if you take into account Chinese positions at the ridges).
On July 10, India’s Ministry of External Affairs and China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs held the 16th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, where both sides committed to “ensure complete disengagement of the troops along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and de-escalation from India-China border areas for full restoration of peace and tranquility in the border areas in accordance with bilateral agreements and protocols.” This was followed up on July 11 with a brief statement by the External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar, who, while speaking at the India Global Week organized by India Inc., said that:
What’s just happened is that we have agreed on the need to disengage because the troops on both sides are deployed very close to each other. So there is a disengagement and a de-escalation process which has been agreed upon. It has just commenced. It’s very much work in progress.
Discussions on the disengagement process are likely to continue to this week, with a fourth meeting of the Corps Commanders from India and China slated to meet early this week. Their meeting will likely focus on the standoffs at Pangong Lake and Depsang, where disengagement will be more difficult. For one a reciprocal withdrawal, as seen in Galwan and Hot Springs, will not be possible, as India believes it is China that has entered deep into Indian territory, with an ingress of 8 km in Pangong Lake alone. That India would withdraw 2-3km if the Chinese do the same would still mean the Chinese are 5-6km in Indian territory, while India remains 11-12 km away from it’s perception of the LAC at Finger 8.
Such serious concerns have also been expressed by those observing the withdrawal process at large. Amb. Shivshankar Menon, former national security advisor, has outlined some of the concerns in an interview with Suhasini Haider of The Hindu:
I think it’s actually dangerous, to speak of disengagement pullback, withdrawal, buffer zones. These suggest that we are withdrawing from territory which we have controlled consistently, and that we were part of the problem to start with. China stopped us from doing our normal patrols in these areas, which we’ve done for years. The Chinese have stopped us from doing so at several points since April. And I don’t hear anybody saying that we are going back to those points. So, frankly, if we are withdrawing from territory that we have controlled, I don’t understand what is happening here. As I said, we talk about the fog of war; this is the fog of peace. And there isn’t enough information coming out clearly. But it seems to me that we are setting a dangerous pattern.
He goes on to note two key takeaways that I largely agree with. Firstly, he notes that India-China relations will no longer be the same, or business as usual. We’ll have to see what new shape these relations take as time goes on after this episode. However, he also notes that “[China] learned the lesson that as long as the Indian [government] could walk away with a propaganda victory, they could actually make gains and change the outcomes on the ground in their favour.” And that’s where I think the real risk is, and where we can see some truth to his hypothesis. Looking at some of the media coverage over the past week, it’s clear to see that some are already basking in the “propaganda victory” when it is far too early to be taking a victory lap.
Expert Voices:
Dr. Sameer Lalwani, senior fellow for Asia strategy and director of the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center: Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn from the Sino-Indian Crisis
Dr. Shashi Tharoor, Indian Member of Parliament and former Chairman of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs: India’s strategic options for dealing with China
Atman Trivedi, managing director at Hills and Company, International Consultants: How to Counter China
Dr. Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Distinguished Fellow & Head, Nuclear & Space Policy Initiative at the Observer Research Foundation: Calls for India to play the Taiwan card grow louder
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Rethinking India’s “Encounter” Policies
This week, the saga of Vikas Dubey, the Uttar Pradesh gangster who was shot and killed by police, seemed to known to everyone before it even happened. Dubey, who had pending cases of nearly 60 criminal accusations that ranged from murder to arson to kidnapping, was being transported from Madhya Pradesh to Uttar Pradesh when he was killed by police in an “encounter” shooting. Police officials allege that Dubey had stolen a police officer’s handgun after the vehicle he was being transported in overturned.
There are a lot of basic questions about this incident. How did Dubey capture the gun when he was likely handcuffed and secured in the vehicle? Why did he surrender to the police in Madhya Pradesh only to flee after? However, the important policy question for me is how much longer will India be comfortable with police officers using excessive force to kill suspected criminals in the name of law and order?
The story of encounters isn’t new in India. Police officers who have killed notorious criminals such as Dubey in such encounters are publicly lauded by, both, citizens at large and leaders. Hindi films - both fictional and based on reality - show dramatic accounts of such encounters, reinforcing the notion that these incidents are “good.” Such encounters have become a reality in the state where Dubey was killed, with reporters finding that in Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath’s first year in office, 49 people have been killed and 370 were injured in over 1,100 encounters. Most of the dead belonged to minorities, such as Dalits, Muslims, and Other Backward Classes. The story of apprehended suspects stealing police handguns is an oft-repeated narrative in the reports of such encounters.
This is not to say that police officers don’t do a dangerous job, or that sometimes, the use of force is necessary. However, at a time when a global conversation has been sparked about excessive use of force by police, it is high time India look inwards to its own police practices, and question not only why “encounter killings” are so commonplace, but that they are celebrated?
I am well aware of the arguments of the other side - that India’s court system is slow, that criminals get off the hook using political connections, or are able to obtain bail, that convictions are hard to get, and are even often overturned. And I can even sympathize. Vikas Dubey is a clear example of this reality. He often was bailed out when arrested for crimes, no successful prosecution was mounted against him, he maintained strong political ties, and even ran for local office himself.
But the answer is not extrajudicial killings, which is what these encounters are. Collectively, we as a society have the responsibility to punish those who commit crimes, yes. And we pass that responsibility on to the state. But we do not have the responsibility to kill (at least not without due process, although we can get into a debate about the death penalty another time). And if we do want to assume the responsibility to kill, we better accept the consequences that that comes with - the use of force against innocents who match a vague description, against those caught in the crossfire, against dissidents and protestors rallying against a popular government, against minorities, and against those who cannot defend themselves. We better accept the consequences that we may give up yet another claim to India being a liberal democracy.
News Roundup
The Central Board of Secondary Education has reduced the curriculum for years 9-12 by 25%. In doing so, however, it has removed crucially important topics such as “Democracy and Diversity,” “Citizenship,” “Nationalism,” and “Secularism.”
Taking one step further beyond the Indian government’s decision to ban 59 Chinese apps, the Indian Army has instructed its soldiers and officers to stop using 89 total apps. These include the 59 apps banned by the government, plus an additional 30 which include Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, Reddit, Tumblr, Tinder, and others.
India’s Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla held consultations with U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Hale, where they discussed the “entire gamut of engagements under the India-US Comprehensive Global Strategic Partnership, including political, economic, commercial, regional and international cooperation.”
On July 14, Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal will hold a U.S.-India Commercial dialogue over videoconference with U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross. The two ministers will likely discuss President Trump’s executive order to suspend H1-B visas through 2020, dual social security taxation for Indian workers, and India’s decision to impose an “equalization levy” on business-to-business transactions in digital advertising, and on e-commerce operations. The Dialogue will take place alongside a meeting of the U.S.-India CEO Forum.
The Ministry of External Affairs announced that the next and 15th edition of the India-European Union Summit will be held on July 15. The summit will be co-chaired by Prime Minister Modi, President of the European Council Charles Michel and the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen.
The Indian Army is reportedly set to order an additional 72,000 Sig Sauer assault rifles from the United States. The purchase comes after India previously placed an order for 72,400 Sig Sauer’s in 2019 under the “fast track procedure.” The rifles will help fulfill the Indian Army’s requirement for 800,000 (8 lakh) new assault rifles to replace the 22-year old Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) rifles.
The Ministry of Power has issued a new order mandating that “all equipment, components, and parts imported for use in the power Supply System and Network shall be tested in the country to check for any kind of embedded malware/trojans/cyber threat.”
The Ministry of External Affairs is set to undertake a significant diplomatic reshuffle:
Vikram Doraiswami, currently Additional Secretary at the MEA in charge of the Bangladesh and Myanmar (BM) portfolio as well as international conferences and global organizations, to be posted as India’s new High Commissioner to Bangladesh;
Riva Ganguly Das, the current High Commission to Bangladesh, will return to New Delhi to serve as Secretary (East), taking over from Vijay Thakur Singh, who is set to retire from the Indian Foreign Service in September;
Rudrendra Tandon, India’s Ambassador to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), will take over as India’s Ambassador to Afghanistan; and
Gouranglal Das, currently Joint Secretary (Americas) in the MEA, will be the new Director-General at the India-Taipei Association
On July 10, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh held separate telephone conversations with U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and South Korea’s Minister of National Defense Jeong Kyeong-Doo.
Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal is slated to hold a trade ministerial dialogue with U.K. International Trade Secretary Liz Truss, scheduled to be held towards the end of July. The dialogue will be the first such interaction between the two ministers.
Four to Read
From cogent analysis to potentially big news that you should keep an eye on, here are a few commentaries and other pieces of writing that I found particularly enlightening.
Anand Raghuraman, Senior Associate at The Asia Group and former Visting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, writes: “Chinese aggression in the Himalayas has exposed the widening power differential between Delhi and Beijing and lent new urgency and importance to efforts that deepen the US-India partnership. It is vital that Washington does not miss its moment to cement ties with Delhi nor squander a golden opportunity to amplify pressure on Beijing. A digital airlift offers Washington a path to do both in one stroke using modern tools of statecraft, not boots on the ground. It is a worthwhile endeavor for the Trump administration to pursue and one that the next occupant of the White House should carry forward beyond 2020.”
Emily Tamkin, the U.S. editor of the New Statesman and the author of The Influence of Soros, argues: “There are some who see Moscow’s importance as little more than a fond memory. While the Indian government maintains that it must have good relations with both the United States and Russia, there are others in India today who insist its future is solely, or at least primarily, with the United States… But being friendly with Washington does not mean New Delhi can’t maintain important ties with Moscow. The world has changed, but India and Russia have found ways for their relationship to hold firm, standing steady for each other at times when the rest of the world wouldn’t, maintaining largely consistent foreign policies despite changing leaderships, and refusing to bury a historic partnership.”
Shakti Sinha, Director of Atal Bihari Vajpayee Institute of Policy Research and International Studies at the Maharaja Sayajirao University, Vadodra, and former director of the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, argues: “Looking ahead, India must look at Nepal beyond Oli, and even beyond the China factor. The latter is here and India should not even try and match the incentives that China offers. Instead, India must engage Nepal’s political and social spectrum on a sustained basis. Intelligence agencies, while needed, are not a substitute, for political and diplomatic engagement.”
Gunjan Chawla, Programme Manager at the Centre for Communication Governance, writes: “The June 2020 amendment to the Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technology [SCOMET] list is a highly significant development, as this is the first official document that strongly suggests the existence of offensive cyber capabilities specially designed for military use in the broader ecosystem of tech regulation in India.”
Thanks for reading this latest edition of Indialogue. Please let me know if you have any thoughts or feedback by emailing me at aman@amanthakker.com.